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INTRODUCTION
"I do not know, condone, comprehend or understand homosexu-
ality in any way, shape, form or size. "
Rock musician Sebastian Bach1
In his fable "The Lover and His Lass," James Thurber tells the
story of two parrots who listen with disdain and derision to a pair of
hippopotamuses making love, unable to comprehend what the hippos see
in each other.2 The parrots consider reporting the offensive lovemaking
to the ABI (African Bureau of Investigation) on the grounds that the
hippos' ungainly amorous activities are "probably a threat to the security
of the jungle."3 Instead, the parrots merely gossip to their neighbor par-
rots about the shameless hippos.'
Later that evening the hippos overhear the parrots engaged in affec-
tionate foreplay, and express their own incomprehension that beings as
alien as parrots could have any conceivable sex appeal, and joke with
their own neighbors about the incomprehensible parrots.' The moral of
the story is: Laugh and the world laughs with you, love and you love
alone.
Many heterosexuals look upon gay and lesbian couples with this
kind of incomprehension. Same-sex relationships are often understood as
mere friendships lacking the supposedly closer bonds resulting from op-
posite-sex relationships as exemplified by marriage.7 Out of this incom-
prehension and misunderstanding, three structures emerged to stigmatize
homosexual people for expressing their love for one another: psycho-
analysis had identified them as sick;8 many organized religions identified
1. Goldstein, "Skid Row's Sebastian Bach Embroiled in AIDS Row," L.A. Times, Jan.
21, 1990, Calendar at p. 34, col. 1 (quoting Sebastian Bach).
2. J. THURBER, FURTHER FABLES FOR OUR TIME 36-39 (1956).
3. Id. at 38.
4. Id.
5. Id at 38-39.
6. Id. at 39. For an exhaustive examination of the fable and a thorough explication of
how it illustrates ways of knowing and imagining others, see Greimas, The Love-Life of the
Hippopotamus: A Seminar with A.J. Greimas, in ON SIGNS 341-62 (1985).
7. The parrots' misunderstandings about lovemaking as a security threat suggest the cur-
rent reasoning underlying the military's exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the armed
services. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc);
Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 1990 U.S.
LEXIS 1125 (Feb. 26, 1990) (No. 89-876).
8. K. LEWES, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY 29.30
(1988).
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them as immoral;9 and the law had identified them as criminals."0
All three systems are now being revised. The psychoanalytic com-
munity long ago abandoned its definition of homosexuality as an ill-
ness." Some modem religious scholars do not accept the supposed
monolithic religious bias against homosexuals; theologians and religious
scholars have challenged the very foundations of religious dogma that
assume homosexual immorality without analysis or inquiry.' 2 And since
at least the mid 1950s, legal scholars have questioned the use of the crim-
inal law to penalize acts defined as consensual adult sodomy, whether
heterosexual or homosexual.13
Issues relating to homosexuality are now squarely before courts all
over the country. Federal courts alone have recently decided cases deal-
ing with discrimination against homosexual citizens by the military,' 4
general anti-homosexual discrimination by the Department of Defense,'"
and a university's refusal to fund gay student groups.' 6 While this Com-
ment will necessarily touch on some issues presented in those contexts,
its focus is on a parallel concern which will remain unresolved despite the
outcome of those cases: What is the status, not of homosexual individu-
als, but of same-sex couples? Specifically, how are gay or lesbian rela-
tionships best viewed within a context that presumes family relationships
are'exclusively heterosexual? In this century the Constitution has been
interpreted to protect sexuality within the marital relationship from gov-
ernmental intrusion. 7 While homosexual citizens are generally prohib-
ited from marrying, 8 they consistently form identical relationships for
nearly identical reasons. 9 Gay men and lesbians have the same emo-
9. See, eg., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
10. See id. at 187-88 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
11. See K. LEWES, supra note 8, at 213-29.
12. See, eg., J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY
(1980); N. PITTENGER, The Morality of Homosexual Acts in HOMOSEXUALITY AND ETHICS
139-45 (1980). For a broader philosophical inquiry into the morality of homosexuality see M.
RUSE, HOMOSEXUALITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1988).
13. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 13-15 (1963); see also Hardwick, 478
U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 214-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Ben-Shalom v.
Secretary of the Army, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625
(C.D. Cal. 1987), appealfiled No. 87-5914.
15. High-Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
16. Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
17. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522
P.2d 1187 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Peplau & Gordon, The Intimate Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, in
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tional, social and sexual needs as heterosexuals; intimate relationships
are equally integral to their lives. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that certain intimate human relationships must be protected
against state intrusion.20 This Comment will argue that stable and signif-
icant homosexual relationships meeting the Court's criteria must be pro-
tected under that reasoning.
Part One of this Comment discusses the Supreme Court's frame-
work for analyzing certain sexual relationships between consenting
adults, focusing on the Court's analysis of nonprocreative acts such as
sodomy and heterosexual sex using contraception. The Comment then
examines the Court's major decisions on marriage and intimate family
relationships under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The second section of the Comment introduces the central problem:
because same-sex couples have not been viewed as families in the same
way opposite-sex couples have, state courts and legislatures may have
assumed that the Supreme Court's language extending protection to sex-
ual relationships which fall under the rubric of "family" does not apply
to gay or lesbian couples.
Part Three first examines how we view same-sex couples differently
from opposite-sex couples. For example, we have a word and a cere-
mony, marriage, to legitimate the relationships of opposite-sex couples
which we deny to same-sex couples. Moreover, no matter how we try to
disguise our bias against same-sex couples (if in fact we try to disguise it)
the bias is evident in the language we use when we discuss them, or
choose not to discuss them. Part Four examines illustrative cases from
state courts across the country in which the question of same-sex families
was central.
Finally, Part Five suggests three possible solutions to the problem:
1) recognizing same-sex couples as de facto families; 2) legalizing same-
sex marriage; and 3) creating a relationship that permits legal recognition
of same-sex relationships for some purposes-a proposal that is gaining
increasing acceptance.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Problems in Defining the Class
A constant theme of this Comment is that an important barrier to
society's understanding of homosexuality arises from the misuse of Ian-
CHANGING BOUNDARIES: GENDER ROLES AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 226-44 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Peplau].
20. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
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guage. Before such a discussion can even begin, it is important to look
briefly at the word "homosexual" itself, and the class of people it
describes.
The word "homosexual" was not invented until 1891, and does not
appear in English until the early part of the 20th Century.21 While the
Latin term "sodomita" was used to describe people who engaged in ho-
mosexual acts in the Middle Ages, it also connoted a variety of other
unenumerated sexual acts,22 primarily due to the vagueness inherent in
the Old Testament story of the city of Sodom.23 Prior to the 20th Cen-
tury, this lack of a word to describe people who engaged in homosexual
acts as a distinct class would have obscured the idea that homosexual
persons as a class were being denied legal rights.
Even in this century the concept of a class of homosexual persons
causes confusion. Rhonda Rivera notes that the following have all been
labeled as "homosexual":
-a married father who engaged in same-sex behavior in his
late teens.
-a man with a single conviction for a same-sex sex crime.
-a woman whose friends were bisexuals.
-a man who said he was a homosexual but never admitted any
overt same-sex behavior.
-women in mannish attire.
-persons who exhibited characteristics and mannerisms which
evidenced homosexual propensities.2
This Comment will follow Rivera's convention of using "homosexual"
only as an adjective. 2' A large part of our misunderstanding of gay men
and lesbians is evident in the linguistic usage which allows sexual orienta-
tion to eclipse all other aspects of character and personality. By identify-
ing gay men and lesbians as "homosexuals," it may too easily be assumed
that they have permitted this aspect of their identity to become their pri-
mary identity. This is very different from the way most heterosexuals
view their own sexual orientation, which is to say heterosexuals would
21. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 42-43 & n.4.
22. Id. at 93 & n.2.
23. Id. at 93.
24. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the
United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 801-02 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
25. A person's sexual preference is but one part of his or her character, and acting
upon it occupies a small part of his or her actual existence. Hence, the author has
used the word "homosexual" only as an adjective which describes the sexual orienta-
tion of the individual rather than using "homosexual" as a noun which implies a
being whose sole dimension is an erotic one.
Id. at 804.
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not ordinarily identify themselves as heterosexual, but view their hetero-
sexuality as a subordinate, though still important part of who they are.
Homosexuality is similarly only an aspect of identity.26 Assumptions by
heterosexuals that homosexual citizens view their sexuality differently
simply reinforce the stereotype that homosexual people identify them-
selves solely or primarily in the erotic realm in a way that heterosexuals
typically do not. Thus the use of "homosexual" as an adjective will be a
means of presenting homosexuality to heterosexual readers in a way that
more fully accords with the way most homosexual people, as well as
most heterosexuals, truly view their own sexual orientation.
Preconceptions about homosexual people which are at work in the
unconsidered use of language are illustrated by use of the phrase "life
style," which is commonly appended to "homosexual."27 The concept
that homosexuality is a "life style" is a means of importing stereotypes
and prejudices into the discussion. What is a homosexual "life style?"
How is it different from a heterosexual "life style?" What, in fact, would
a heterosexual "life style" be? Does Orrin Hatch or Debbie Gibson live a
heterosexual "life style?" How about John Tower? Hugh Hefner? All
are clearly heterosexual, but what useful information does that bare fact
provide about any other aspect of their lives? 8
"Life style" does not appear in discussions of any other minority.
There is no discussion of a black "life style," a female "life style," a
handicapped "life style." The variety of those group members' lives is-
at least in most modem legal analysis-assumed. But for prejudice, the
variety in the lives of gay men and lesbians would also be apparent. The
presuppositions tucked into the phrase "homosexual life style" are invidi-
ous and discriminatory. We assume a commonality based on homosexu-
ality that may or may not exist in any individual case. This commonality
is not similarly assumed based on heterosexuality. Such presuppositions
hinder, rather than help, discussion of the issue, and have no place in
legal discourse.
A second linguistic barrier to understanding homosexual people is
26. Id.
27. See L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (seven uses of term in one
column of court's printed opinion).
28. For an example of an appropriate use of the phrase, see Scott, Life Style of Mormons
Cuts Risk of Death, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 3. The study specifies what consti-
tutes the Mormon "life style" (e.g., regular churchgoing, refraining from tobacco or alcohol,
regular exercise, a good night's sleep) and, most importantly, relates those factors to a specified
context-in this case, health. Id. Equally important, the study examined a separate group of
non-Mormons who exhibited the same life style traits, thus acknowledging that the character-
istics are not confined to the group at issue, a step seldom taken when charging homosexual
people with living a particular life style.
(Vol. 23:1055
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the confusion among the concepts of sexual orientation, gender identity
and gender role behavior.29 Sexual orientation is an attraction to same-
gender, as opposed to opposite-gender partners.30 Gender identity is an
individual's belief that she or he is male or female.3 1 Gender role behav-
ior involves acting in traditionally "masculine" or "feminine" ways.32 A
common stereotype dictates that if an individual varies in one category
he or she will inevitably vary in the others as well.33 This is not true. As
Letitia Ann Peplau notes:
[A] typical heterosexual woman is attracted romantically and
sexually to men (sexual orientation), she knows without doubt
that she is female (gender identity), and she frequently enacts
the roles or behaviors that society defines as appropriate for
women. A lesbian differs from this pattern in that her sexual
and romantic attraction is to women. The stereotype assumes
that the lesbian must also differ in her gender identity and gen-
der role behavior. This assumption is wrong.
Homosexual people are not confused about their gender
identity: lesbians are not different from heterosexual women in
their sureness of being female, nor do gay men differ from het-
erosexual men on this dimension. In terms of [gender role] be-
havior, research indicates that most gay men are not effeminate
in dress or manner, nor are lesbians usually "masculine" in
their behavior.34
This Comment deals only with sexual orientation. Issues of gender
identity and gender role behavior are entirely separate from a discussion
of the law as it relates to sexual orientation. As Peplau notes, research
indicates most gay men and lesbians do not have confused gender identi-
ties, nor do they typically enact cross-gender role behavior.35 Even if
this were not true, though, it is unclear how that would affect a discus-
sion of the legal issues of due process, equal protection and freedom of
intimate association. Why would it be legally significant that a homosex-
ual man affects conventionally feminine mannerisms? Would it be le-




33. For example, the Reverend Lou Sheldon has stated his belief that high school students
who identify themselves as homosexual are experiencing "gender confusion." FRONTIERS
NEWSMAG., Sept. 21, 1988, at 7.
34. Peplau, supra note 19, at 228-29 (citations omitted).
35. Id.
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gaily significant if a heterosexual man adopted the same conventional
feminine characteristics? On what theory?
Another difficulty in defining the class of homosexual people is the
relationship among homosexual behavior, heterosexual behavior and bi-
sexual behavior. At least since the famous Kinsey studies of 1948 and
1953,36 it has been clear that humans act in a continuum of sexual behav-
ior. The studies showed some people engaged only in heterosexual be-
havior, some only in homosexual behavior, and many engaged in both.37
It is certainly, then, possible to argue from behavior to orientation: those
who engage in only homosexual acts can safely be described as having a
homosexual orientation; those who engage in exclusively heterosexual
acts can be assumed to be of heterosexual orientation. Everyone else is
bisexual. But that argument relies on an assumption that sexual conduct
and sexual orientation have some sort of direct correspondence. Such a
correspondence may or may not exist. The categories of sexual conduct
and sexual orientation, even at the extreme ends of Kinsey's behavioral
spectrum, do not need to be identical.38
This Comment takes the position that the Kinsey studies suggest
that at least some people are truly, completely and immutably homosex-
ual in orientation, and thus that the state may not pass laws which per-
mit penalties based on that status. While the Kinsey studies suggest this
would be a relatively small group,39 the size of the group would be irrele-
vant to laws criminalizing status.4°
Defining a class of homosexual people is important because the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Unites States Constitution protects citizens against arbitrary and
invidious discrimination. 41 Discrimination based on categorization by
36. A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
(1948); A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter HUMAN MALE and HUMAN FEMALE, respectively].
37. HUMAN MALE, supra note 36, at 650-51; HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 36, at 488.
38. See Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(Norris, J., concurring) (Army regulations which purport to target only homosexual conduct
in fact target homosexual orientation). See id. at 715 ("In short, the regulations do not penal-
ize soldiers who have engaged in homosexual acts; they penalize soldiers who have engaged in
homosexual acts only when the Army decides that those soldiers are actually gay.").
39. HUMAN MALE, supra note 36, at 650-51; HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 36, at 488.
While it is possible that some people whose behavior is entirely homosexual might not claim a
homosexual identity, it is equally likely that some from the much larger group whose behavior
was bisexual would claim to be homosexual.
40. The United States Supreme Court has long held that a status may not be made crimi-
nal. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
41. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967).
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race, for example, is subject to the Court's strictest scrutiny.4 2 Other
class-based distinctions must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
on characteristics that have a fair and substantial relation to a statutory
purpose to assure that all persons similarly situated are treated alike.43
Those who argue that homosexuality is simply a behavior engaged in by
fundamentally heterosexual persons remove this line of equal protection
analysis.' 4 The argument that homosexuality is an immutable character-
istic like race or ethnicity suggests that the Equal Protection Clause's
class-based analysis is appropriate.45
Immutable and permanent membership in a discrete and insular mi-
nority is not a prerequisite for a separate branch of analysis which guar-
antees that the political process will not be distorted by unfair
prejudice.46 For example, the Court has recently held that in order to
state a cause of action under sections 1981 and 1982 of Unites States
Code Title 42, a plaintiff need only show discrimination based on racial
ancestry or characteristics.47 Use of the word "characteristics" suggests
that actual membership in the class is not necessary if discrimination
occurred because of perceived membership in the group.
This analysis can be applied to perceptions of homosexuality. A
person may be perceived to be homosexual based on something as simple
as attendance at a fundraiser for a gay-rights organization.4" Actual sex-
ual conduct or orientation is irrelevant to this societal imposition of the
stigma which attaches to a homosexual identity. Subjective judgments
about a person's homosexuality are not uncommon. At least one federal
court of appeals has held that a prisoner's status as a homosexual may be
determined by "a purely subjective judgment" based on the appearance
of weakness, small size or effeminacy.4 9 In the present system, legislators
who are afraid of being identified as homosexual may not vote in favor of
42. Id. at 11.
43. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
44. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1356-58 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane).
45. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 724-28 (Norris, J., concurring).
46. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also Hal-
ley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Iden-
tity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 924-26, 929-32 (1989).
47. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congre-
gation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987). See also School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987)
(section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which denies federal funds to state programs that
discriminate based on physical handicap, protects those discriminated against who are "re-
garded" as handicapped).
48. Halley, supra note 46, at 970.
49. Gay Inmates v. Barksdale, 819 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1987); see Halley, supra note 46, at
947 & n.15.
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legislation favorable to the gay community because the political risks of
the rumor that the politician is gay or lesbian are high, regardless of
whether the legislator is, in fact, homosexual.
In short, prejudice against homosexual people is not limited to peo-
ple who engage in homosexual sex, or identify themselves as homosexual.
It is certainly easier to discriminate against a self-identified lesbian or gay
man, but self-identification is not a necessary prerequisite. If you are
reading this Comment where someone.can see you, or leave it open on
your desk, or, more strongly, argue its position, the prejudice against
homosexual people is available against you, regardless of whether you
engage in homosexual sex, heterosexual sex or no sex at all. And the
more forcefully you make the argument in favor of gay rights, the more
skeptically many people will view protestations of heterosexuality.5 0 The
prejudice against homosexual orientation suggests that a court should
carefully review laws that burden homosexual citizens.5
B. The Constitution and Sex
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, like most of us,
have some difficulty dealing with human sexuality. 2 The cases discussed
here are often convoluted and contradictory. Discussions of sex in our
fundamentally puritan, yet nominally libertarian culture are bound to be
problematic. This is especially true when the issues arise in a constitu-
tional context.
1. Confusing sodomy and homosexuality: Bowers v. Hardwick
The Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick53 illustrates
the difficulty in discussing sexual activities. Hardwick is the only deci-
sion of the Court-at least as the majority frames the issue-that deals
squarely and solely with a right to engage in particular sex acts. Griswold
50. Presumptions of homosexuality are so powerful that arguing against gay rights will
also raise eyebrows and rumors. Reverend Lou Sheldon, an avid anti-gay rights activist has
been suspected of latent homosexuality. Lichtblau, A Savvy "Free Agent for God," L.A. Times,
Nov. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
51. In Gay Law Stidents Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., the California court held that the
state's labor code provisions protecting political activity protect against discrimination against
people "who identify themselves as homosexual, who defend homosexuality, or who are identi-
fied with activist homosexual organizations." 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488, 595 P.2d 592, 610-11, 156
Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1979).
52. For a discussion of this difficulty in the related context of obscenity, see Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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v. Connecticut,54 Eisenstadt v. Baird,55 Stanley v. Georgia, 6 and Skinner
v. Oklahoma,57 each implicated the right to engage in some form of sex-
ual activity, but in those cases the Court framed the issue in other terms.
Griswold was decided on the issue of marital privacy; 58 Eisenstadt was
decided on equal protection grounds; 9 Stanley was framed and decided
as a first amendment issue;' and Skinner addressed the right to have
offspring.6" In each case the Court avoided the issue which the Hardwick
majority squarely addressed: the fact that human beings engage in vol-
untary sexual activity simpliciter, without reference to a relational con-
text.62 This decontextualization occurred in Hardwick because the
majority framed the issue in terms of homosexuality. In the prior cases
the Court had dealt with heterosexual activity, and that permitted the
Court in each case to view the familiar sexual activity in a constitutional
context which allowed analysis of some issue other than the sexual act
implicated. But in Hardwick, because of the alienated status of homosex-
uality, the majority was able to decide the case outside the constitutional
referents as if only sex were involved. 3
The facts of the case were not in question. Michael Hardwick was
arrested under a Georgia statute which criminalized as sodomy perform-
ing or submitting to "any sexual act involving the sex organs of one per-
son and the mouth or anus of another." ' The prior version of the
statute had defined sodomy as "the carnal knowledge and connection
against the order of nature by man with man, or in the same unnatural
manner with woman."'65  Both clearly include acts of heterosexual
sodomy.
The Georgia prosecutor decided not to press charges against Hard-
54. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married couples have constitutional right to purchase
contraceptives).
55. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute permitting married couples to purchase
contraceptives, but prohibiting sale to unmarried couples violates Constitution).
56. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state cannot constitutionally punish private possession of obscene
material).
57. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute which permits sterilization of certain criminals violates
Constitution).
58. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
59. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55.
60. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
61. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
62. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 ("No connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated."). "Family,"
"marriage" and 'procreation" are the contexts within which sexual activity can occur.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 214 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)).
65. Id. at 215 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing GA. CODE, tit. 1, pt. 4, § 4251 (1861)).
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wick, but Hardwick had standing to challenge the statute because he re-
mained in danger of prosecution.6 A heterosexual couple who had not
been arrested joined the action as plaintiffs, but were dismissed by the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for lack of standing.67 This left Hard-
wick as the sole plaintiff, and allowed Justice White and Chief Justice
Burger, in his concurrence, to isolate the issue as homosexual sodomy,
even though, in the Respondent's Brief, Hardwick is never once identi-
fied as a homosexual, nor is the sex of his partner mentioned.6 8 For the
adjudication of the constitutional issue these facts were irrelevant.69
As Hardwick's counsel pointed out, Georgia defined this "crime"
"in terms of the anatomical parts involved, not in terms of any relation-
ships violated."70 Yet the Court found this most private conduct offen-
sive enough to allow states to condemn it with the criminal law.71
Hardwick noted that "[t]he State of Georgia labors long in its brief to
establish a proposition Respondent has never denied: namely, that the
protection of the public realm is a legitimate interest that may be ad-
vanced by state law."72 This is, of course, irrefutable, and it is precisely
the issue the Court should have addressed: How is a private act of sex a
threat to the public realm?
The word "public" did not appear in the majority opinion. The
Court did not address the nature of the public harm posed by sodomy,
except to invoke notions of morality.73 According to the majority, mo-
rality, like legislation, is something that may be voted on and passed by
majority consent.74 The Court's majority not only rejected natural law
as a constitutional standard, but rejected it as a standard for judging
moral conduct, accepting a kind of democratic moralism without further
inquiry.75 This is, of course, just the reverse of the claim Aristotle made
for natural law, that it "does not depend upon acceptance.
'76
It is elementary in the law that for an act to be criminal it must
66. Id. at 188.
67. Id. at 188 n.2.
68.. See generally Brief for Respondent, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
69. See generally Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Brief for Respondent at 23, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
71. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
72. Brief for Respondent at 19, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis in original).
73. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
74. Id. (rejecting claim that "majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality
should be declared inadequate").
75. Id.
76. THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 189 (1955) ("There are
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ordinarily consist both of a wrongful act and a guilty mind.77 That
mental state is a critical factor in determining, for example, culpability
for various degrees of murder.78 In the case of sodomy, though, there is
virtually no defense available once the act has been proved. 79 This sug-
gests that the state views sodomy as an especially grave moral harm. But
what is the moral harm of sodomy? Why is sodomy a proper subject of
criminal law? If, as the majority suggests, the criminal law is based on
notions of morality, then, at the very least the Court has a duty to make
sure the state has asked the relevant moral questions, rather than merely
asserting the existence of one moral position and nothing more.8° This is
a central problem with the majority opinion. The morality of heterosex-
ual acts is not so easily, or often, called into question. The morality of
marital sexual acts of any nature seems to be beyond question. In Gris-
wold the issue of morality was raised by only one justice. 81 The open
question of whether Hardwick applies only to homosexual sodomy per-
mits an argument that heterosexual sodomy might not be so inherently
immoral. The majority in Hardwick never discussed why or if there
would be a difference between heterosexual or homosexual sodomy.
The Court did not examine any of the literature which suggests
there is no reason to view the morality of homosexuality as per se differ-
ent from heterosexuality. For example, H.L.A. Hart argued that sod-
omy, including homosexual sodomy does not violate moral standards.82
Hart is joined by theologians such as Norman Pittenger, who examined
this stance with specific reference to homosexuality in "The Morality of
Homosexual Acts."83 After discussing the requirements for any act to be
sinful (i.e., immoral),84 Pittenger, like Hart before him, is unable to dis-
two sorts of political justice, one natural and the other legal. The natural is that which has the
same validity everywhere and does not depend upon acceptance.").
For a discussion of the significance of rejecting the natural law theory as it would apply to
sodomy, see infra note 266.
77. See P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 1 (1985) ("A defendant is not guilty unless he per-
formed the wrongful act with the required 'culpability.' ").
78. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-92 (West 1988); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2
(1985).
79. Focus on the act, to the exclusion of anything else, is complete, for example, in Geor-
gia, where sodomy is defined as performing or submitting to "any sexual act involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
80. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
81. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring) ("There is no serious contention
that Connecticut thinks the use of artificial or external methods of contraception immoral or
unwise in itself.").
82. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
83. N. PITTENGER, supra note 12, at 139-45.
84. Id. Pittenger argues that the inner spirit of the actor and the manifest intentionality of
the action must both be analyzed to make a moral determination. Id. at 139.
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tinguish any per se difference between homosexual and heterosexual
acts. 5
Michael Ruse arrived at the same position on philosophical
grounds.8 6 His conclusion is that:
[O]nce you strike out as fallacious arguments about biological
naturalness, and bring forward modem realizations of the pos-
sibilities for homosexuals of meaningful relationships, the
Kantian and utilitarian positions come very much closer to-
gether. Certainly, at a minimum, there is moral worth in the
close-coupled relationships of the Second Kinsey study, and
probably more .... Homosexuality within a loving relationship
is a morally good thing. 7
The Court's failure to address these arguments is significant. Once
the issue of procreation is removed from the discussion as Griswold and
Eisenstadt seem to do, the differences between heterosexual sex and ho-
mosexual sex are surely only those of physical geography but for the gen-
der of the parties.8 8 If a state can say that sodomy is immoral, then why
is morality an issue in some sexual positions (i.e., anal or oral intercourse
under the Georgia statute) but not others (for example non-procreative
vaginal intercourse). If sexual positioning is a moral issue, may a state
find vaginal intercourse in the missionary position moral but not vaginal
intercourse in some more creative or athletic configuration? The diffi-
culty of the Court's reasoning is illustrated by altering the facts of Stan-
ley v. Georgia,89 where the Court held that the plaintiff was protected by
both the privacy associated with his home, and the first amendment for
possessing obscene films in his home.90 Instead of possessing obscene
films, if Mr. Stanley had brought home an inflatable doll, would the Stan-
ley rule cover him in his home, or the Hardwick rule? If Hardwick ap-
plies,9" would the state's defined and proscribed sodomitic activities
apply to what he did with the doll? Would vaginal intercourse with the
doll be protected by Griswold or Eisenstadt? After Hardwick, would the
85. Id. See also FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY DIVERSITY FOR THE
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Supp. Part I, at S-204 (1988) [hereinafter CITY OF Los ANGELES
TASK FORCE REPORT].
86. See M. RUSE, supra note 12, at 196.
87. Id.
88. Procreation is, of course, the typical reason for "justifying" sex. See E. PAGELS,
ADAM, EVE AND THE SERPENT 11-12 (1988).
89. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
90. Id. at 565.
91. A doll would probably not receive the same first amendment protection that a film or a
book would.
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sex of the doll be relevant? Dispositive? The Court's failure to address
or distinguish the clearly separable issues of sodomy and homosexuality92
has led to the conclusion by some state courts that Hardwick is about
homosexuality, not sodomy.93
The source of the confusion is obvious. The majority asserts that
the line of family rights cases described in Carey v. Population Services
International94 did not support the claimed right of homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy, then argues that "[n]o connection between family, mar-
riage or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other" had been shown. 95 At this point the Court indicated it had col-
lapsed all homosexual activity into "homosexual sodomy." As a result
of that collapse, the Court was able to refer to the right to "homosexual
conduct" 96 as if it were synonymous with a purely sexual "right," the
right to engage in "homosexual sodomy." 97 Homosexual conduct, how-
ever, extends well beyond the limited sexual activities proscribed by
Georgia's law.98 It is possible to read this as the Court tailoring a very
narrow opinion to the specific facts of the case. But another reading is
that the Court viewed homosexual people as a different class from heter-
osexuals when it comes to sodomy.
In reality, the "homosexual activity" the Court referred to, as well
as the "homosexual conduct" cited by both Justice White and by the
Chief Justice encompass a far broader range of activities than mere sod-
omy. If Georgia had wished to prohibit homosexual conduct or activity,
it would have had to draw its lines much differently. If, for example, the
police officer who accidentally observed Hardwick and his companion
had found them engaged in mutual masturbation (or any of a number of
92. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195. See also id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
93. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 418 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 3240 (No. 88-1503 1989) ("In Bowers v. Hardwick the Supreme Court considered
whether the right to privacy extended to the conduct of homosexuals.").
94. 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
95. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 195.
97. Id. at 196. In an article the majority relied on, Survey on the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. RExV. 521 (1986), the authors
also conflate sodomy and homosexuality. For example, the very first words of the Introduc-
tion are: "At common law, and at one time by statute in every state of the United States,
sodomy was a criminal act. Traditionally, states have considered homosexuality to be 'sinful,
sick and criminal.'" Id. at 523-24 (emphasis added).
98. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) with Army Regulation 635-200, discussed in
Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 713 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J.,
concurring). For activities covered by the Army regulation, but not by the Georgia statute,
compare activities listed infra note 99 with the Army Regulation.
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other non-sodomitic acts open to them99), he could not have arrested
them under the Georgia law. Georgia defined the "crime" in terms of
the anatomical parts involved, utterly ignoring the relationships noted by
the Supreme Court"° which provide a context for the sexual act. This is
the ultimate decontextualization of sex. It restricts the focus to nothing
more than body parts in motion, and ignores the human beings to which
those body parts are attached. But what is the importance of family,
marriage or procreation with regard to sexual activity?
The reference to procreation is, of course, absurd as a justification
for sodomy. Like sex using contraception, sodomy is definitionally non-
procreative. Marriage, though, would absolutely have prevented the
state from scrutinizing the couple's sexual relationship after Griswold,
regardless of procreation.' 01 For whatever reason, marriage justifies even
non-procreative sex.
The Court's inclusion of "family" relationships on the list is curious.
Not all traditional family relationships protect a sexual relationship. For
example, sexual relationships with family members related by blood are
not legally protected since incest is clearly a reason for a state to intrude
on a sexual relationship."0 z In fact, of the traditionally understood fam-
ily relationships, it appears that only those based on ties of marriage
would protect a sexual relationship from state intrusion. 0 3 This inclu-
99. For example, in a recent proposed survey of American sexual practices by the National
Institutes of Health, which was denied funding by the House Appropriations Committee, thir-
teen potential sex acts were listed:
Hug
Kiss
Deep or tongue kiss
Undress your partner
Stimulate your partner's breast or chest with your hand
Stimulate your partner's breast or chest with your mouth
Rub your genitals on your partner's body
Stimulate your partner's genitals with your hand
Stimulate your partner's genitals with your mouth
Vaginal intercourse
Stimulate your partner's anus with your fingers
Stimulate your partner's anus with your mouth
Anal intercourse
Of these, only three-stimulating genitals by mouth, stimulating anus by mouth and anal in-
tercourse-are sodomitic under Georgia's law. Even considering that same-sex couples cannot
engage in vaginal intercourse, that still leaves nine activities considered by the NIH to be
sexual open to gay or lesbian Georgia citizens. Malanowski, "The Fine Print," SPY, Nov.
1989, at 31-32.
100. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
101. Id. at 217-18 & n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 196.
103. See id. at 218 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sion may have content, however. As discussed below, Supreme Court
decisions suggest that there may be a broader definition of family that
could include unmarried same-sex couples."° In addition, cases discuss-
ing the right to marry suggest that states could not have prohibited
Hardwick from marrying his partner."0 5 Hardwick's citation of marriage
and family, then, suggests that the context in which sexual relationships
occur is of considerable, perhaps determinative importance.
2. Marriage
Marriage is among the most easily comprehensible relationships be-
tween two adults. The Supreme Court has dealt with it in several
situations.
In Loving v. Virginia,"6 the Supreme Court held that "marriage is
one of the 'basic civil rights of man.' "107 In that case the Court invali-
dated a Virginia statute which prohibited whites and blacks from mar-
rying,"°8 holding that the statute violated the fourteenth amendment
because it involved invidious racial discrimination. 109 The Court said:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis
as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifi-
cations so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the
heart of the fourteenth amendment, is surely to deprive all the
states' citizens of liberty without due process of law. 1 0
Further, in Zablocki v. Redhail," I the Court held that "the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."12 In Zablocki,
the Court struck down a statute which provided that a divorced resident
who was required to support non-custodial children could not marry
without court approval." 3 The Court, in striking down the statute, indi-
cated that the right to marry is buttressed by the right to privacy:
"'Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
104. See infra notes 151-81 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 106-50 and accompanying text.
106. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. See also Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98
YALE L.J. 145 (1988).
110. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
111. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
112. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 390-91.
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faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.' "114
The right to marry, though, may be curtailed for certain valid state
reasons." 5 Thus, "[laws prohibiting marriage to a child, a close relative,
or a person afflicted with venereal disease," are valid." 6 And, in a deci-
sion from the term prior to Zablocki, the Court in Califano v. Jobst 117
held valid a provision of the Social Security Act which cut off benefits to
a dependent handicapped child upon marriage, even if the child were
permanantly disabled and married another disabled person who was not
receiving social security benefits. 1 8 The respondent claimed the statute
infringed on his right to marry because it penalized him for marrying
members of a certain class--other disabled persons not receiving bene-
fits.' The Court ruled that the statute had a legitimate rationale: cut-
ting off child dependency benefits at marriage follows from the
reasonable assumption that children who marry will no longer be depen-
dent on their parents.' 20 Thus, the statute treated married persons as a
class differently than unmarried persons as a class, and was constitution-
ally acceptable, contrasting sharply with the Wisconsin statute in
Zablocki, which determined solely "who may lawfully enter into the
marriage relationship."''
These decisions indicate that a homosexual state resident could
challenge a state law which prohibited persons of the same sex from mar-
rying unless the state could provide some compelling interest to prohibit
homosexual residents from marrying.' 22 When a fundamental right is at
stake, under a due process analysis, the Court may not presume facts
unless they are "necessarily or universally true in fact."' 23 Thus, the
Court would be bound to carefully examine the state's interest in
preventing same-sex couples from exercising their fundamental right to
marry.
Thus far, no federal court has so carefully examined any asserted
114. Id. at 384 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
115. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
118. Id. at 58.
119. Id. at 48-49.
120. Id. at 53-54.
121. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. When a fundamental right is at stake the Court requires a state to show a compelling
interest in order to justify interfering with the right. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
123. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (state cannot presume college student is
non-resident simply because she applied from out of state). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974) (state cannot conclusively presume that women four or five
months pregnant are incapable of continuing service as teachers).
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state interest in preventing same-sex couples from marrying. In 1971,
the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the case of
Baker v. Nelson, 24 in which the plaintiffs challenged a Minnesota law
authorizing only heterosexual marriages. 125 Ten years later, the Court
denied certiorari in the case of Adams v. Howerton,126 in which a minister
had married a male United States citizen and a male alien.1 27 The effect
of the marriage would have been to qualify the alien as the citizen's
spouse for immigration purposes.12 This was challenged by the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Ninth Circuit upheld
the INS challenge, without having to determine whether the marriage
statute was constitutional.'29 Instead, the court found that Congress had
intended to exclude persons of the same gender from being one another's
spouse.130 The court said, "The term 'marriage' ordinarily contemplates
a relationship between a man and a woman."'' But the court then went
on to cite Fiallo v. Bell 32 and observed that "[i]n the exercise of its broad
power over immigration and naturalization, 'Congress regularly makes
rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.' "113 While Ad-
ams can hardly be cited as a ringing endorsement of the rights of gay
men and lesbians, it does give some judicial recognition that a rule
prohibiting homosexual persons from exercising a right "of fundamental
importance for all individuals," might be, to some, "unacceptable."'1 34
In fact, states have an interest in promoting intimate relationships
between their citizens. This has been referred to as the "relational inter-
est.' 35 The United States Supreme Court has addressed this relational
interest on several occasions. In Griswold v. Connecticut,136 the Court
noted two distinct rights: the rights "to marital privacy and to marry
and raise a family,"' 137 separating the relational interest-the right to
marital privacy-from the interests surrounding procreation and child-
124. 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
125. Id. at 311, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
126. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
127. Id. at 1038.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1039 n.2.
130. Id. at 1040.
131. Id.
132. 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
133. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1042 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
134. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
135. Note, Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants' Relational Interest?,
58 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1467 (1985).
136. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
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rearing.1 38 As regards the relationship between spouses, the Court
stated, "it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate
than a husband and wife's marital relations."
1 39
Seven years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 14 the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives
to unmarried persons while permitting distribution to married couples.
41
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, dealt only with this relational
interest when he said that "the marital couple is not an independent en-
tity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individu-
als each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." '142 This
view implies that the state is not interested in the marital relationship
solely for the relationship's own sake; it takes the analysis one step fur-
ther and looks at why such relationships are important to society. A
state cares about the effect those relationships have on the individuals
involved; people who are in close, intimate relationships can provide each
other with emotional and spiritual support, can enrich one another in
ways that are important to the functioning of society as a whole.
Thirteen years later, a federal district court in Michigan decided
Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Department.1 43 In that case, the plain-
tiff police officer, separated from his wife, and living with another wo-
man, was dismissed from his position for violating a state statute against
illegal cohabitation." The district court overturned the conviction,
viewing the relationship as one akin to marriage, "characterized by inti-
macy, voluntary commitment, stability, psychological involvement, and
in the heterosexual context, procreative potential. It has ... been noted
that the idea that the intimate relationship, rather than the formal mar-
riage ceremony, as the essence of marriage finds support in the tradition
of common-law marriage."
145
While North Muskegon is not a United States Supreme Court opin-
ion, it provides two important insights into the problem faced by homo-
sexual couples. First, intimacy, voluntary commitment, stability and
psychological involvement are all highly private factors that recall the
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
140. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
141. Id. at 441-43.
142. Id. at 453.
143. 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985).
144. Id. at 586.
145. Id. at 589 (citing Note, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1289-96 (1980)).
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"harmony in living" and "bilateral loyalty" cited in Griswold,146 and are
not exclusive to marital relationships. As the North Muskegon court
pointed out, common-law marriage was a way of recognizing those quali-
ties in relationships that had not achieved the talisman of a marital
contract. 147
Second, the North Muskegon court recognized that there is a context
other than the heterosexual context in which these factors may be pres-
ent. This recognition exposes the position in which homosexual couples
find themselves-at present they cannot declare their good intentions up
front and get legally married to prove they value intimacy, voluntary
commitment, stability and psychological involvement.1 48 But even if
they do exhibit all the requisite qualities which we value ag a society
through the maintenance of a relationship over time, same-sex couples
are sometimes even barred from receiving common-law recognition of
their relationship (and accomplishment) for any legal purpose. 149
Nevertheless, marriage is not the only kind of family relationship
that is possible. In fact, the Supreme Court's decisions about the consti-
tutional status of family relationships indicate that, even absent a mar-
riage, certain voluntary relationships between two adults may be
protected family relationships.1 5 °
3. State definitions of "family"
The United States Supreme Court is apparently unwilling to inter-
fere with a legislature's power to define family except in the most egre-
gious circumstances. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,15' the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance which limited land use to single-family dwell-
ings and defined "family" as one or more persons related by blood, adop-
tion or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping
unit, or not more than two persons living and cooking together as a sin-
gle housekeeping unit though not related by blood, marriage or adop-
tion.' 2 A landlord who had rented his house to six unrelated college
students challenged the ordinance on several bases, including that it was
146. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
147. North Muskegon, 563 F. Supp. at 589.
148. See, eg., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash.
App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983).
149. For example, in states like California, which have abolished common-law marriage by
requiring formalities, CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983), same-sex couples have no way of
forming a legally binding marriage.
150. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
151. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
152. Id. at 2.
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of no concern to the villagers whether the residents of the house were
married or unmarried.
153
In its opinion, the Court pointed out that the ordinance did not pro-
hibit two unmarried people from constituting a family154 and held the
ordinance was a rational exercise of legislative discretion in defining fam-
ily.1 55 The Court explained that "every line drawn by a legislature leaves
some out that might well have been included," '56 and, citing Justice
Holmes, acknowledged that deference must be shown to the legislative
decision "unless we can say that it is very wide of any reasonable
mark." '157 The Court held that this particular ordinance did not impli-
cate any protected rights to privacy or association."8 Significantly, the
Court pointed out that the challenged ordinance in Belle Terre did in-
clude in its definition of "family," two otherwise unrelated people living
together. 159
The ordinance invalidated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland 160 also
included two otherwise unrelated people as families. The problem with
the ordinance was that it defined "family" in a way that prohibited a
grandmother from living with her two grandsons, who were first cous-
ins.61 Relying on the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment
which the Court said protected "personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life,"' 162 the plurality cited cases dating back to 1923 which
recognized 'a private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.' ",163 In such cases, the Court said, it was bound to examine the
governmental interest "carefully."1
In Moore, the plurality opinion and Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion take for granted that families are institutions for raising chil-
dren.161 Yet both opinions suggest, as the plurality explicitly states, that
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id. at 8.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 8 n.5 (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41 (1928)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
158. Id. at 7-9.
159. Id. at 8.
160. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
161. Id. at 496-97. Note this is a non-procreational family relationship which the Court is
protecting.
162. Id. at 499.
163. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 503-04. ("It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our
most cherished values."); id. at 504-05 ("millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an
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there is a "larger conception of family."' 66 Specifically, Justice Brennan
argued, in concurrence, that limiting the definition to conventional "nu-
clear families" failed to include family forms commonly adopted by
blacks. 167 In his words, "the Constitution cannot be interpreted, how-
ever, to tolerate the imposition by government upon the rest of us of
white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living." '168 Brennan
clearly acknowledged and rejected the notion that the government was
operating on the unstated assumption that "families" ought to be like
conventionally defined "white" families-father, mother, children. This
acknowledgement recognizes one unstated preconception lurking in East
Cleveland's definition of family-that families are, or ought to be, like
white families. By a parity of reasoning, the state should not be able to
assume that families are, or must be, like heterosexual families.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees169 suggests the constitutional mini-
mum for defining family relationships, based on the right to intimate as-
sociation. In that case, the Court found that Minnesota's Human Rights
Act, 170 which prohibited discrimination based on sex, applied to a state
chapter of a national organization which did discriminate based on
sex.' 7 ' More important, the Court held that the Act did not violate the
organization's first amendment rights of association.' 72 In discussing
what those rights are, the Court stated, in a unanimous section of the
opinion, that individual liberty includes protection of certain rela-
tionships:
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may un-
derlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that
certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the
culture and traditions of the Nation .... [T]he constitutional
shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from
close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from un-
warranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability in-
dependently to define one's identity that is central to any
environment"); id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting "role of the family in raising and
training successive generations of the species") (all emphasis added).
166. Id. at 505. Justice Brennan notes in his concurrence that the ordinance "displays a
depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our
society." Id. at 507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
168. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
169. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
170. MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 3 (1982).
171. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
172. Id.
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concept of liberty. 173
Thus, relationships that "attend the creation and sustenance of a fam-
ily"174 as well as similar "highly personal relationships"' 17 5 are protected
against state intrusion by a coalition of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
1 76
A focus on the couple's relationship itself, as opposed to the envi-
ronment provided for their children, addresses the questions raised by a
strict view of marriage as solely for the purpose of procreation. If mar-
riage is only for raising children, why, for example, should infertile per-
sons be allowed to marry? Or those who decide not to have children? Or
women who have passed menopause? Or homosexual couples? The only
group of adults we prohibit marriage to is the last. We use lack of pro-
creative ability against gay men and lesbians in a way we do not use it
against heterosexuals. Similarly, homosexual couples who do have chil-
dren, or wish to, are also prohibited from marrying, despite our insis-
tence that children ought to be brought up in a stable, two-parent home.
This connection between family, marriage and intimate association
was explicitly addressed in Hardwick. Justice Blackmun said in his
dissent:
We protect the decision whether to marry precisely because
marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loy-
alty, not commercial or social projects . .. ." We protect the
decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so
dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of dem-
ographic considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful
and multiply .... And we protect the family because it con-
tributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals, not be-
cause of a preference for stereotypical households .... The
"ability independently to define one's identity that is central to
173. Id. at 618-19.
174. Id. at 619.
175. Id. at 618.
176. The first amendment is critically important to gay men and lesbians. Unlike racial
characteristics, or differences based solely on gender, homosexual citizens must assert their
identity as a homosexual person through some form of speech before they may even have a
public identity as homosexual. Thus, phrases such as "acknowledged," "admitted" or "self-
identified" nearly always accompany the word "homosexual" in conventional public discourse
when referring to a homosexual speaker. As the Court has noted, "The essential thrust of the
First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas;
it shields the man who wants to speak ... when others wish him to be quiet." Harper & Row
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House,
23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
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any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum;
we all depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties
with others." '177
While Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hardwick relied heavily on sub-
stantive due process and privacy arguments to protect intimate sexual
activities, x78 it has been pointed out17 9 that an argument based solely on
privacy is inadequate to deal with homosexuality within family relation-
ships because those relationships extend beyond the confines of the home:
[A privacy argument] assumes that homosexuality is merely a
form of conduct that can take place in the privacy of the bed-
room at a specified time, rather than a continuous aspect of
personality or personhood that usually requires expression
across the public/private spectrum ... relegating sexuality to
the private sphere revives an element of the old "separate but
equal" doctrine-the belief that the separation of one group
from the world of more general social interaction is neither un-
equal nor stigmatizing.18
Families are by their nature social units. As far as voluntary sexual
aspects of adult relationships are concerned, "the state creates the private
sphere by determining its contours and limits, and protects it by granting
it alone the shield of privacy." 181 By failing to recognize that same-sex
couples exist within this relational context, and have a need for this pro-
tection, states create a world for homosexual citizens which looks very
different from the world the state creates for heterosexuals.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
"I come from the old school. Anybody of the same sex I consider
friends, not as a girlfriend or boyfriend. "
-U.S. District Judge R. Brooks Smith 
18 2
The central problem, then, for homosexual couples, is that they are
not usually viewed within this relational context. The United States
Supreme Court cases may be viewed as providing one set of rules which
177. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1986) (citations
omitted) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) and Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
178. Id. at 202-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1290 (1985).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. FRoNTIERs NEWSMAG., Dec. 29, 1989, at 13.
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apply to heterosexuals, based on relationships, and a separate set of rules
for homosexual people that focuses only on non-relational sexual activ-
ity. Thus, Loving v. Virginia,13 can be read as holding that marriage is a
fundamental right for heterosexuals.I84 Griswold v. Connecticut 18s would
only protect the sexual aspect of heterosexual marriage from state scru-
tiny regardless of the procreative nature of the act.186 On this reading,
Bowers v. Hardwick 181 only needs to apply to homosexual people because
only homosexual couples cannot get married.18 8 Moore v. City of East
Cleveland ' 9 and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 9o may similarly be nar-
rowly read to protect only heterosexual family relationships. This nar-
row reading would also apply to Roberts v. United States Jaycees.191
Same-sex couples are nearly always denied family privileges which
opposite-sex couples may receive by getting married.'92 Stated another
way, opposite-sex couples are viewed as one another's family members
while same-sex couples are not. While most privileges arising from a
relationship are economic ones such as employment benefits, tax advan-
tages or recovery for certain relational torts such as loss of consortium,
an overriding issue for homosexual couples is the benefit of sexual pri-
vacy. If the Supreme Court means to assert through Griswold and Hard-
wick that a state may penalize as immoral certain sexual acts outside of
marriage or family relationships, but those same acts are protected when
they take place within a marriage or family relationship, and if a state
may prohibit same-sex couples from marrying or forming any other rec-
ognized family relationship, then homosexual citizens are deprived of ac-
cess to any sexual privacy in a way heterosexual citizens are not. Such a
construction of the law would effect more than just a pernicious or dis-
183. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
184. Id.
185. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
186. Id. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
187. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
188. Id. at 196.
189. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
190. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (definition of "family" in zoning ordinance which limits-with ex-
ceptions-single family dwellings to occupancy by "traditional" families, or groups of not
more than two "unrelated" persons does not violate due process).
191. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (first and fourteenth amendments protect certain intimate
associations).
192. Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987) (denying gay couple
tort recovery granted to married couples); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167
Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985) (denying gay couple employment benefits granted
to married couples). But see Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (granting gay survivor lease-succession rights granted to married
couples).
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criminatory scheme: it is imposing a self-fulfilling prophecy on homosex-
ual state citizens. The state may determine that sexual relationships
outside marriage are immoral and then may assure that homosexual citi-
zens are immoral by denying them the only available means of legitimiz-
ing their relationship.
Two related barriers prevent us from recognizing the dimensions, or
even the existence of the problem. The first aspect of the problem is a
restricted point of view: because most legislators and judges are hetero-
sexual, the problem faced by homosexual couples may too easily be seen
as being no problem. Heterosexuals may discount or ignore entirely the
world as viewed by a homosexual person, and make a decision based on a
world-view that perceives homosexual citizens as if they were heterosexu-
als making incorrect choices.
Secondly, a heterosexual world-view is inherent in the very language
we use. Positive words like "family" and "marriage" are perceived to
have no content for homosexual citizens at all. Moreover, words with
negative connotations like "sodomy" are seen as stigmatizing only homo-
sexual people, even if they facially apply to heterosexuals as well.
More important, because there is no named relationship for same-
sex couples, judges use the only words for same-sex relationships that are
available to them: words such as "friends" or "roommates." 193 Such
words are grossly inadequate to describe permanent, lifetime commit-
ments between two people, and serve to diminish or ignore the impor-
tance of the relationship to the parties. Married couples do not view
themselves only as roommates or friends, and any insinuation that that
was the extent of their relationship would be greeted with frosty hostility.
Yet for same-sex couples this trivialization of their relationships is
common.






I remember one evening this past winter, talking with a group of
193. See, eg., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. App. 1986)
(lesbian partner referred to as "friend" and "roommate"); Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d
1269, 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1987) (gay men who described their relationship as "ex-
clusive lifetime committment" referred to by court as "friends").
194. "The Caretaker," H. PINTER, Two PLAYS BY HAROLD PINTER 29 (1960).
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men who were taking the journal-writing class I was teaching to
persons with AIDS and their care givers. A long article in the
Minneapolis Star-Tribune had implied that we were lucky that
in Minneapolis AIDS had hit only gay men and had not spread
to heterosexuals. The anger in the room was palpable, the weari-
ness apparent.., due not to the disease these men or their lovers
suffered but rather to the never ending dismissal of their worth as
human beings.
1 95
A primary reason for trying to exempt gay and lesbian couples from
the normal rules of human relationships is to uphold our belief that they
are "different." In her discussion of the United States Supreme Court's
1986 Term, Martha Minow explores the way in which judges deal with
those they perceive to be "different." 19 6 She points out that" 'difference'
is only meaningful as a comparison. I am no more different from you
than you are from me. A short person is different only in relation to a
tall one." '197 Minow then notes that "[l]egal treatment of difference tends
to take for granted an assumed point of comparison: women are com-
pared to the unstated norm of men, 'minority' races to whites, handi-
capped persons to the able-bodied, and 'minority' religions to
'majorities.' "198 This leads to the conclusion that "attributions of differ-
ence reflect choices by those in power about what characteristics should
matter,"'199 and the implication that "the assignment of differences in
Western thought entails not just relationships and comparisons but also
imposition of hierarchies." 2" A dramatic example of this hierarchy is
the Constitution's original formula for determining the number of repre-
sentatives each state would be entitled to in the House-while both free
persons and slaves were to be counted in each census, slaves were valued
at only three-fifths of a free person.201 There can probably be no clearer
illustration of how the perception of difference implies lower worth than
this purely mathematical one.
The same hierarchy is strikingly demonstrated with regard to homo-
sexual people in Schochet v. State.2°z In concluding that Bowers v. Hard-
195. Landsman, The Long Breath of Grieving, HUNGRY MIND REV., Sept. 1989, at 3.
196. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10 (1987).
197. Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
198. Id. (footnote omitted).
199. Id. at 38.
200. Id. (footnote omitted).
201. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3.
202. 75 Md. App. 314, 541 A.2d 183 (1988).
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wick203 does allow a state to prohibit private acts of heterosexual
sodomy, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals pointed out that a
claimant who had engaged in a sodomitic act would "fall into one of
three classes that may have constitutional significance: part of 1) a ho-
mosexual couple (male or female); 2) an unmarried heterosexual couple;
or 3) a married heterosexual couple, in roughly ascending hierarchy of
favor.' '2 4 To the Maryland court, the understood consequence of there
being homosexual persons is to rank them at a lower level than heter-
osexuals without any further analysis. If homosexual persons did not
exist as a class with a significant difference (i.e., if they were seen as being
members of a broader class called "citizens") the court would have had
only two categories to consider, married and non-married people, and
that difference, also seen as significant, would have involved ranking the
married people above the non-married. Differences seen as insignificant,
such as hair color, involve no such assumed hierarchical structure.
The dissenters in Hardwick also pointed to this hierarchy implicit
in the majority's analysis. Justice Blackmun noted the majority's "al-
most obsessive focus on homosexual activity,"2 °5 and continued: "Un-
like the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded on the
assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that
their lives may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it
limited the choices of those other citizens."2 °6 Likewise, Justice Stevens
faults the majority for positing "as a justification for the Georgia statute
the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homo-
sexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable," ' 7 and cites the broader
reading that the law "reflects the belief that all sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable. 2 0 8 Thus the majority in Hardwick assigned significance
to Hardwick's sexual orientation while the dissenters found that differ-
ence insignificant.
There is, however, an even deeper significance to the concept of dif-
ference in a legal context. As Minow points out, "legal treatment of dif-
ference.., tends to treat as unproblematic the point of view from which
difference is seen, assigned, or ignored. '2 09 Thus, for example, under the
Schochet court's analysis, a court may assume that homosexual people,
like the court itself, accept as inevitable the hierarchy of favor based on
203. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
204. Schochet, 75 Md. App. at 319, 541 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added).
205. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Minow, supra note 196, at 14.
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sexual orientation.2' To the extent that the point of view of gays and
lesbians differs, it may be viewed as irrelevant. This is so because "differ-
ence may seem salient not because of a trait intrinsic to the person, but
instead because the dominant institutional arrangements were designed
without that trait in mind."211
Minow uses California Federal Saving & Loan Association v.
Guerra 21 2 as an example of how institutionalized bias becomes invisible.
Guerra addresses the issue of pregnancy in the workplace, and Minow
discusses the different ways the issue may be viewed:
The Court debated whether the [Pregnancy Disability Act] for-
bids differentiation based on pregnancy even if the differentia-
tion benefits rather than injures even the person who becomes
pregnant. The case presented a choice between "equal treat-
ment" and "special treatment." Thus framed, this question
treated men as the norm and presumed a workplace designed
for men (or nonpregnant persons). Any effort to remake the
workplace to accomodate pregnancy would be "special
treatment.
213
Because the complaining women were employed in a workplace that
was not designed to accomodate pregnancy, an accomodation which at-
tempted to permit women a qualified right to reinstatement following a
pregnancy leave created a classic conflict in perception.21 4 From the in-
stitutional point of view, because men cannot get pregnant, any attempt
to give a woman a. right to return to her job after a pregnancy leave
would treat women differently than men (who cannot get pregnant), and
thus afforded women special treatment. This assumes that a workplace
designed exclusively for those who do not get pregnant is both inevitable
and right.
But from another point of view a workplace designed exclusively for
the non-pregnant is a product of historical forces, and gives women no
opportunity for equal treatment from the start. The "special" treatment
they ask for would not be special at all if the workplace had been
designed in the first place to include female employees. Under such a
view the difference of pregnancy would be of minor relevance-a wo-
210. Schochet, 75 Md. App. at 319, 541 A.2d at 185.
211. Id.
212. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). See Minow, supra note 196, at 41.
213. Minow, supra note 196, at 41.
214. Compare Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289 (equal treatment) with id. at 304 (White, J., dissent-
ing) (special treatment).
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man's return to work after pregnancy would be the accepted norm, and
would need cause no comment.
The first view diminishes a woman's claim that the system is unfair,
treating her complaint as unproblematic. It views the existing institu-
tionalized workplace as neutral and sees the complaint as an attempt to
undo that neutrality. This is precisely the position gays and lesbians are
in with regard to marriage and families. It is believed that these institu-
tions exist by nature without homosexual couples in mind. Thus, in
Jones v. Hallahan,21 5 a Kentucky court held that two lesbians were not
prevented from marrying one another because of the Kentucky statute
involved (which did not specify the sex of eligible marriage partners), but
"rather by their own incapability of entering into a marriage as that term
is defined." '16 Even more to the point is Singer v. Harazl7 in which two
gay men were prohibited from marrying under a Washington statute.218
The court concluded that "[lit is apparent from a plain reading of our
marriage statutes that the legislature has not authorized same-sex mar-
riages. '2 19 As one commentator has pointed out, "the meaning of the
statute is not quite as 'plain' as the court would like to convey. A 1970
amendment to the statute substituted the word 'persons' for 'men and
women.' "220 Given the fact that the possibility of same-sex marriage
had been publicly debated when the citizens voted for the statute,221 and
the revision had been enacted anyway,222 a powerful argument can be
made that the relationship designated by the word "marriage" had been
altered to fit an emerging cultural change.
In both cases, the courts had to go to some linguistic effort in order
to avoid a statutory construction that would challenge a received and
conventional notion of marriage22 3 And in each case the court used, as
its rationale, a conclusory approach which accepted the conventional as
unchallengable; for example, the Kentucky court appealed to dictionary
definitions of marriage.22 4 But, of course, dictionary definitions are only
present indications of the relationship between a word and what it signi-
fies. It now appears that marriage originally did include homosexual
215. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973).
216. Id. at 589.
217. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1973).
219. Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 248, 522 P.2d at 1188-89.
220. Rivera, supra note 24, at 877 n.470.
221. Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 249 n.5, 522 P.2d at 1190 n.5.
222. Id.
223. Id.; Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
224. Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
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couples, 225 and laws which prohibited such marriages were not passed
until more than four centuries into the Christian era.226 Further, it now
appears that the original Christian ceremony for uniting couples united
same-sex couples.227
We are engaged in this country in a difficult struggle to determine
which differences matter for legal purposes, and which do not. We have
seen the harm done to blacks by making skin color a difference that mat-
ters-blacks were viewed because of their race alone as inferior.228 The
reasonfor making race a difference that mattered was to accomplish just
that hierarchical end. Similarly with women, we know that to view gen-
der as a difference that matters outside of contexts to which sex is di-
rectly relevant, such as childbearing, is to decide, for that reason alone,
that women are less important than men.
We face precisely this question today with respect to sexual orienta-
tion. We wish to believe that sexual orientation is a difference that mat-
ters so that we may treat homosexual citizens as being on a lower
hierarchical rung than heterosexuals. We, in fact, sometimes view only
homosexual people as having a sexual orientation. Thus, in a recent elec-
tion in Irvine, California, one minister attempting to revoke the city's
Human Rights Ordinance as it applied to homosexuals claimed that the
ordinance gave "special rights" to homosexual citizens because it assured
equal protection based on sexual orientation. 22 9 To this man, the concept
of sexual orientation simply does not implicate heterosexuality at all. An
ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orienation gives
special rights only to those who have a sexual orienation-gay men and
lesbians.23 On this analysis, the concept of heterosexuality becomes
completely, and utterly, invisible.
225. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 82-83 nn.100-03 and accompanying text. Professor
Boswell's upcoming book will explore the subject of same-sex relationships during the early
Christian era in much more depth.
226. J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 123.
227. See C. Glaser, A Love Without Pretense: Lesbian & Gay Union Ceremonies, MORE
LIGHT UPDATE, May 1988, at 1-3 (discussing and citing ceremony in extant Christian texts);
Wockner, Christian Gay Marriage Rites Uncovered, FRONTIERS NEWSMAG., Feb. 8, 1989, at 8
(citing address by John Boswell at University of Chicago, discussing fourth century Christian
ceremony uniting same-sex couples).
228. See, eg., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
229. Zonana, Gay Agenda Takes Beating-Even in San Francisco, L.A. Times, Nov. 9,
1989, at Al, col. 1.
230. Perceptions of gender difference lead to the same result. In that area, too, it is some-
times assumed that only women and not men, have a gender. Thus a defendant sought to
disqualify a female judge from hearing an employment discrimination case because of her abil-
ity to identify with those who have suffered race or sex discrimination. The judge refused to
recuse herself, stating, "If background or sex or race of each judge were, by definition, suffl-
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B. Language
"I am convinced it is a lesson which has universal application:
namely, that it always pays to be suspicious of words and to be
wary of them, and that we can never be too careful in this re-
spect.... [Tihis is not just a linguistic task Responsibility for
and towards words is a task which is intrinsically ethical. "
Vaclav Havel2 '
'"LJanguage is the condition of the unconscious. "
Jacques Lacan 
232
We tend to believe that language is a highly rational tool invented
by rational beings for rational purposes. This is true, to an extent. Lan-
guage is a primary means of communication. Nevertheless, language is
only a collection of words used to clarify our thoughts, which are not
words but mind processes that words help to make public. In the last
half of this century semiotics has examined the relationship of signs, such
as words233 to the thoughts or ideas they are supposed to represent by
examining the cultural code systems by which we generally understand a
word to mean a given thing.234 This can be relatively uncomplicated
when the thing a word signifies is quite concrete. When I identify a piece
of citrus fruit as an orange anyone who understands the English noun
"orange" will understand me.23 5
The process becomes considerably more complicated when the con-
cept to be identified is not so concrete. If I use the word "orange" as an
adjective color, for instance, the connection between the signifier "or-
ange" and the signified concept becomes more tenuous. The perception
of color is a highly subjective act, and depends largely on very controlled
cultural training.236 Perceptions about sexuality share much of this same
subjectivity and cultural conditioning, as Thurber pointed out with the
cient grounds for removal, no judge of this court could hear this case, or many others, by
virtue of the fact that all of them were.., of a sex." Minow, supra note 196, at 13 n.15.
231. Havel, Words on Words, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 18, 1989, at 8.
232. Lacan, Sign, Symbol, Imaginary, in ON SIGNS 206 (M. Blonsky ed. 1985).
233. This discussion deals only with language signs. There are, of course, an infinite variety
of other kinds of signs which the literature of semiotics analyzes. See generally J. SOLOMON,
THE SIGNS OF OUR TIMES (1988); ON SIGNS, supra note 232.
234. ON SIGNS, supra note 232, at xvii.
235. This, of course, can be complicated by subdividing "oranges" into subcategories, spe-
cies, varieties, etc. Thus to a botanist, "orange" might not be definite enough to be meaningful.
To a grocery shopper, however, it will usually be sufficient.
236. Umberto Eco has pointed out how culture plays an important role in what colors we
identify and how we identify them. U. Eco, How Culture Conditions the Colours We See, in
ON SIGNS, supra note 232, at 157-75.
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parrots and the hippos.237
That there are difficulties inherent in language will come as no sur-
prise to those who practice law. At least as early as 1824, Justice John-
son pointed out that "[o]ne half the doubts in life arise from the defects
of language. '2 38 But these difficulties generally go unremarked upon
when the subject is homosexuality. We take it for granted that we under-
stand the language of sexuality, and know what is signified by words such
as "sodomy," "family," etc. Yet the language we use to discuss sexuality
is, perhaps, more culturally conditioned than much of the language we
use in legal discourse. Words dealing with sex, such as "sodomy," and
words like "family" which appear to be non-sexual may conceal a cul-
tural agenda inherited from the past, importing unexamined preconcep-
tions into the discussion.239 Because of that concealment, tension
between the words, themselves, and what they are supposed to signify
has stretched to near the breaking point, thus precipitating the cases dis-
cussed below. This is not to say that "family" and "sodomy" are words
without content. On the contrary, their content has been gradually rede-
fined through the centuries. In our present age it is believed their content
has always been used against homosexual people. 24° This belief is de-
monstrably untrue: "Sodomy" has not always historically been used
solely to persecute homosexual people.24' More importantly, there is
room within even the most currently conventional notions of "family" to
include same-sex couples within its confines.
The following sections will examine the three words which dominate
the cases: "sodomy," "marriage" and "family," and look at some ways
that conventional understandings of their meanings are consciously or
unconsciously skewed against homosexual people.
1. Sodomy
The term sodomy has, since its invention, never had a clear defini-
237. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
238. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 232 (1824).
239. Jack Solomon explicitly discusses how the concept of "natural-ness" is used against
homosexuality as a means of concealing cultural agendas. See J. SOLOMON, supra note 233, at
11-12 n.23.
240. See, eg., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (1986).
241. Indeed, seven states currently define sodomy so that it includes only acts between
members of the same sex. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-122 (1987); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN.
§ 21-3505 (Vernon 1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.090(3) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 201.190 (Michie 1986); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1989). These statutes
provide strong evidence of the ways in which sodomy can be used as a tool against a disfavored
group. See Halley, supra note 46, at 919-20 n.14.
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tion. "It... has connoted in various times and places everything from
ordinary heterosexual intercourse in an atypical position to oral sexual
contact with animals. At some points in history it has referred almost
exclusively to male homosexuality and at others almost exclusively to
heterosexual excess."' 42 The sin of Sodom in Genesis243 is never speci-
fied, and has been variously described by Christian theologians as sloth
or gluttony.2 " Some modem scholars consider the sin to be inhospital-
ity,245 an interpretation consonant with Jesus' own single reference to the
city, which does not include a condemnation based on any sexual activ-
ity,246 and accords with the writings of early Christian thinkers such as
Origen and St. Ambrose.247 Because of the assumption that sodomy was
a sexual transgression, it is available as a weapon against sexual acts out
of favor at a given time, or against a given group of people.
The variety of acts currently permitted or prohibited by the states is
illustrative of the word's inherent vagueness. In Maryland, "sodomy" is
proscribed in one section of the statute24 8 while oral intercourse requires
a separate prohibition.2 49 In South Carolina, "buggery" (a word usually
defined as anal intercourse), is prohibited without definition, apparently
permitting lesbianism.250 In Kentucky, heterosexuals are permitted to
perform acts which for homosexual citizens are criminal.251 In Alabama,
fellatio is acceptable within marital bounds, but criminal for single peo-
ple of whatever sexual orientation.25 2 Missouri is the only state which
defines sodomy to include hand-to-genital contact.253
The problematization of particular sexual acts was an unusual devel-
opment in the history of sexuality. Both the Hellenic and Roman em-
pires had codes of sexual conduct, but those codes focused on sexual
pleasure as it applied to the health of the individual 4.25  Thus guidance
242. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 93 n.2.
243. Genesis 19:1-29.
244. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 98.
245. Id. at 93 n.3.
246. Matthew 10:15-16; cf Luke 10:10-13; see also J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 94.
247. J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 98.
248. MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 553 (1987).
249. Id. § 554.
250. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985). There have been no cases dealing
with the statute.
251. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Baldwin 1985).
252. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-65(a)(3), 13A-6-60(2) (1982).
253. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.010(2) (Vernon 1979). Since intent is not an element of the
crime, police in Missouri apparently have probable cause to arrest many physicians in that
state, including virtually all of those who specialize in gynecology or urino-genitary medicine.
254. M. FOUCAULT, THE USE OF PLEASURE 104 (1986) [hereinafter USE OF PLEASURE].
See generally id. at 97-139.
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was given for good or bad times of day for sex, or places where it would
be best or worst to engage in sexual activities; but who did what to whom
was of little interest to those giving the advice.25 Catalogues of accepta-
'ble and proscribed sexual activity, sometimes elaborate in their detail,
apparently did not have normative moral force until several centuries
into the Christian era.2" 6 This prohibition of certain sexual acts was used
specifically against homosexual people as a class around the thirteenth
century, as popular antipathy to gay people gained momentum after
more than a century of acceptance.257 John Boswell notes that the urban
revival of the tenth through twelfth centuries coincided with the
reemergence of a distinct gay subculture in southern Europe,251 and that
gay men and lesbians are well represented in the highly romantic litera-
ture of the period.259
The prohibition against sodomy was crystallized in Thomas Aqui-
nas' Summa Theologiae.2 6" This was partly due to the rise of intolerance
of all deviations from the Church's assertions of infallibility. As Boswell
notes:
It was particularly significant for gay people that Thomas
[Aquinas'] ideas about homosexuality triumphed just at the
moment when the church began to enforce orthodoxy more rig-
orously than ever before and to insist that everyone accept in
every detail not just the infallible pronouncements of popes and
councils but every statement of orthodox theologians.
Although the intent was not to eradicate acceptance of homo-
sexuality in particular, the effect was to eliminate all opinion in
the church which did not accord with accepted theology on
every matter, and since it was Aquinas'[ ] authority which ulti-
mately became the rule, acceptance of homosexuality ceased to
255. Id. at 104.
256. Some medeival "penitentials," which set out various sins, and their accompanying
punishments were highly specific. At least one particularly influential penitential was specific
enough to include penalties for interfemoral homosexual sex, a distinction which does not
appear in any modem sodomy laws. J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 183 n.47. See also E.
PAGELS, supra note 88, at 29 (Clement of Alexandria proscribing marital intercourse in morn-
ing, during daytime, after dinner, or even at night unless intercourse is performed "with mod-
esty."); cf M. FOUCAULT, CARE OF THE SELF 235-40 (1986) [hereinafter CARE OF THE
SELF].
257. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 330.
258. Id. at 208.
259. Id. at 208-09 & n.6 (" '[C]ourtly love' occurred between women and between men just
as between women and men; statistically, the proportion of gay literature surviving from this
period is astonishing.").
260. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae (1952). See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 318-19.
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be a safe option for Catholics liable to prosecution for heresy.261
It is important to note that this is the climate which immediately pre-
ceded and precipitated the Spanish Inquisition.262
Aquinas' theological basis for opposition to sodomy, based on the
concept that it is "unnatural," despite inconsistencies,263 is evident in
state sodomy laws.264 Aquinas' rationale is evident in Blackstone, upon
whom Justice Burger relied so heavily in his concurring opinion in Hard-
wick.265 The theological position regarding sodomy on which Blackstone
relied was ultimately adopted in the states.266 While theological founda-
tions for secular laws are not objectionable in themselves, there is no
reason to conflate all theological thought into all morality.267 The intol-
261. J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 330.
262. Id. at 269-302.
263. Boswell examines the inconsistencies in some detail. See id. at 303-34.
264. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 211, n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 215).
266. Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy In the Context of HomosexualActivity, 40
U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 526 (1986) ("Blackstone's characterization of sodomy, as a 'crime
against nature,' would serve as the basis for most American sodomy laws.").
The idea that sodomy is "unnatural," found in both Aquinas and, ultimately, Blackstone,
is evident in American sodomy statutes. Compare, for example, the language of the nine-
teenth-century version of the Georgia sodomy statute, GA. CODE, tit. 1, pt. 4, § 4251 (1861)
(sodomy is carnal knowledge "against the order of nature") with Blackstone's language, 4 W.
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 215 (sodomy is "the infamous crime against nature"). The
language referring to "nature" still continues in some states. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1411 (1989) ("infamous crime against nature"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976)
("unnatural and lascivious act"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986) ("crime against
nature"); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2.361 (1988) ("Crimes Against Nature"). The theological ra-
tionale that sodomy is unnatural because it is not procreative is of considerable importance.
Boswell describes four distinct definitions of "nature." J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 11-13.
Of these, sodomitic acts, including sexual acts between members of the same sex, are usually
considered "unnatural" under only one of the definitions, the ideal sense of nature, or what is
known in legal discourse as natural law. For example, both sodomy and homosexual acts are
observable in animals, and are not the product of technology. Under these "realistic" views of
nature, it would be possible to conclude that sodomy is "natural." Id. Thus, when the Court
rejects natural law in Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 (see supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text)
it leaves-apparently-no alternative definition of "nature" under which either sodomy or
homosexual acts would be "unnatural," except the theological one deriving from the morality
associated with procreation-a rationale not yet adopted by the Supreme Court.
267. The possible misuse of, specifically, Christian morality, is pointed out by Vaclav Havel:
What was the true nature of Christ's words? Were they the beginning of an era of
salvation and among the most powerful cultural impulses in the history of the
world--or were they the spiritual source of the crusades, inquisitions, the cultural
extermination of the Americas, and, later, the entire expansion of the white race that
was fraught with so many contradictions and had so many tragic consequences, in-
cluding the fact that most of the human world has been consigned to that wretched
category known as the "Third World?" I still tend to think that His words belonged
to the former category, but at the same time I cannot ignore the umpteen books that
demonstrate that, even in its purest and earliest form, there was something uncon-
sciously encoded in Christianity which, when combined with a thousand and one
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erance, fear and open hatred of homosexual citizens based on fundamen-
tal acts of human connection through sex-acts which for heterosexuals
are given due respect, not to mention process-such intolerance is an
example of the potential dangers of this misuse of the word "sodomy."
The selective use of sodomy against only disfavored groups is starkly
illustrated in Georgia. While the Georgia statute proscribing sodomy ap-
plies to all persons regardless of sexual orientation, or the relative gender
of the parties,2 6 the wording of the Supreme Court's opinion in Hard-
wick regarding the statute treats it as if it only proscribes homosexual
sodomy.269 More important, responding to a Georgia court which re-
cently convicted a heterosexual man of committing consensual sodomy, a
Georgia legislator has stated his legislative plan to exempt heterosexuals
from the law.27°
Georgia would not be the first state to use its sodomy laws only
against homosexual citizens. Seven other states currently have sodomy
laws which do not apply to heterosexuals. 271 This section should make
clear that such a distinction is an historical and definitional aberration.
The "traditional" sodomy laws which the Court in Hardwick relied upon
so heavily272 overwhelmingly did not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. 73
This attempt to treat homosexual people differently than heterosex-
uals based solely on their sexual orientation dramatically illustrates the
core purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. The
heterosexual majority and homosexual minority are both capable of com-
mitting identical acts of sodomy as that term is generally understood in
its modem sense (e.g., anal and oral intercourse). The majority wishes to
other circumstances, including the relative permanence of human nature, could in
some way pave the way spiritually, even for the sort of horrors I mentioned.
Havel, Words on Words, THE NEW YORK REV. OF BooKs, Jan. 18, 1990, at 6. The conflation
of morality into religion has also presented unnecessary problems in presenting morality in our
schools. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L.REv. 1680, 1689-90 (1969).
268. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (1988).
269. See, e.g., Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (pointing out "[t]he
Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity").
270. Harding, Sodomy on my Mind, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 24, 1989, at 18 (quoting state
representative J.E. "Billy" McKinney).
271. See statutes cited supra note 241.
272. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 n.5, at 193 n.6, at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
273. Those which did discriminate did so, as Georgia originally had, by prohibiting sex
between men, but not women. See, e.g., id. at 200 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, it
would not be accurate to say that those sodomy laws which have historically discriminated
have discriminated against homosexuals, since they have only discriminated against homosex-
ual men. If there is a tradition of discrimination against lesbians, it does not arise from the
sodomy laws. Lesbian "sodomy" is of more recent origin. See The Crimes Against Nature, 16
J. PUB. L. 159, 163-69, 173 (1967).
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criminalize those acts, but exempt itself from its own restriction. The
minority, working against a tide of bias and misunderstanding, has
proven unable to prevent or undo the discriminatory law through the
political process. Thus, a law which could apply equally to all citizens is
written (or enforced) to disadvantage only a particular minority.
2. Marriage
The issue of marriage is complicated by the fact that it involves
three hopelessly intertwined ideas: 1) procreation; 2) providing an envi-
ronment for the raising of children; and 3) the relationship between the
partners themselves, which has been referred to as the "relational"
interest.
274
The assumption that the first two interests are vitally important in a
family context is unchallengable. The overwhelming number of mar-
riages are undertaken with the idea of creating a nuclear family in mind,
which is in the best interest of both society and the species. But as dis-
cussed below,27 society also values the relationship between the
partners.
Conventional Western notions of marriage tend toward the roman-
tic. It was not always so. Arranged marriages, mail-order brides, shot-
gun weddings, marriages of convenience, and those to join financial, real
estate, corporate or international interests or empires are also solidly
lodged in the lore of connubial relations.276
Society may benefit from the modern policy of romanticized mar-
riage. In a society where divorce is relatively non-stigmatized, it encour-
ages individuals to find a mate with whom they will be satisfied, thus
promoting the stability of the marriage, and the resulting environment in
which the couple may raise children.
274. Note, Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Cohabitants' Relational Interest,
58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467, 1468 n.3 (1985) (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 915 (5th ed. 1984)). The
value of sexual relationships to the individual is also a cornerstone of Freudian analysis. See
BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH 24 (1970) ("[W]hile adult sexuality serves the socially useful
purpose of breeding children, it is for the individual in some sense an end in itself as a source of
pleasure--according to Freud, the highest pleasure."). The Vatican recognizes the dual pur-
poses of a sexual act, designating them "the unitive meaning and the procreative meaning,"
but views those purposes as only existing within marriage. INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR
HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION, 26, Vatican City
(1987).
275. See infra notes 277-91 and accompanying text.
276. See CARE OF THE SELF, supra note 256, at 72 (marriage began as "a private transac-
tion, a piece of business concluded between two heads of family.., unconnected with the
political and social organization").
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But this spiritual bond between mates is socially useful in another
context as well: It benefits the individuals themselves by fulfilling certain
relational needs that all human beings possess.2 77 One of those needs is
sexuality.
Sexual exclusivity was not originally expected of marital partners.
Both polygamy and divorce were permitted by Jewish law, and in some
cases they were customary. 278 The Roman law prohibiting adultery,
written prior to the first century B.C., prohibited a married woman from
having sex with any man other than her husband, and prohibited a mar-
ried man from having sex with a married woman not his wife, but did not
prohibit a married man from having sexual relations with an unmarried
279 280woman  or, with any man. Sexual relationships could be an adjunct
to a marriage, at least for a man.28 1 Further, homosexual relationships
(and not merely sexual relations) were common enough so that, for ex-
ample, the Emperor Hadrian's relationship with his male lover, Antin-
ous, became a model of love throughout Europe for centuries, despite
Hadrian's official marriage to a woman. 2  Gay marriages were both
known and written about.
283
While the increasing sexual exclusivity of marriage was rationalized
for Christians of the time by reference to Jesus' statement that there are
no legitimate grounds for divorce,2 84 permanent and inalterable marriage
was considered radical in those early centuries285 and, of course, only
applied to the Christian minority. For the non-Christian majority, rea-
sons for marital fidelity were framed in terms of the development of the
277. See Note, supra note 274, at 1475, nn.41-42. Foucault specifically notes that procrea-
tion was not viewed as the sole purpose of marriage as the institution of marriage developed.
See CARE OF THE SELF, supra note 256, at 147:
From this subordination of marriage to civic or familial utilities one should not infer
that marriage itself was considered an unimportant tie that had no value other than
that of producing descendents for the benefit of families and states. We have seen
how demanding were the precepts that Xenephon, Isocrates, Plato or Aristotle im-
posed on spouses so that they might conduct themselves properly in marriage....
All this would suggest a mode of relations that went far beyond generative functions
alone.
278. E. PAGELS, supra note 88, at 11.
279. CARE OF THE SELF, supra note 256, at 73.
280. . BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 62-71.
281. CARE OF THE SELF, supra note 256, at 166. ("Apart from the question of illegitimate
births, and allowing for the ethical requirement of self-mastery, there was no reason to expect a
man, even a married man, to reserve all his sexual pleasures for his wife, and for her alone.").
282. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 12, at 84-86.
283. Id. at 82.
284. Matthew 19:4-6.
285. E. PAGELS, supra note 88, at 13.
[Vol. 23:1055
THE TIE THAT BINDS
self.2" 6 The idea of a "conjugal honor" '287 had enough force that
Musonius notes in On the Purpose of Marriage that while the procreative
function is important to a marriage it cannot, of itself, justify the institu-
tion.288 For example, Michel Foucault notes, between 200 B.C. and 200
A.D.:
The art of leading the married life was considered and defined
in several important texts in a relatively new way. The first
change appears to consist in the fact that the art of matrimonial
existence, while continuing to be concerned with the household,
its management, the birth and procreation of children, places
an increasing value on a particular element in the midst of this
ensemble: the personal relationship between husband and wife,
the tie that joins them, their behavior toward each other, and
this relationship, rather than borrowing its importance from
the other exigencies of the life of a master of a household, seems
to be regarded as a primary and fundamental element around
which all the others are organized, from which they derive, and
to which they owe their strength. In sum, the art of conducting
oneself in marriage would appear to be defined less by a tech-
nique of government and more by a stylistics of the individual
bond.289
A second change involved, specifically, the sexual relationship of the
couple, as the problematization of sexual fidelity arises:
These problems [of infidelity] are still treated in a rather dis-
creet and allusive manner, but the fact remains that one finds,
in authors like Plutarch, a concern with defining a certain way
for marriage partners to act, to conduct themselves in pleasure
relations. Here, the interest in procreation is combined with
other significations and values, which have to do with love, af-
fection, understanding, and mutual sympathy.29°
This further suggests that it is possible, and perhaps necessary, to view
the sexual relationship between a couple as having value aside from and
independent of procreation.
Then, as now, this reasoning applies equally to heterosexuals and
homosexuals, and to non-marital, long-term relationships as well as to
formal marriages. Modern research consistently finds the same needs be-
286. CARE OF THE SELF, supra note 256, at 163-64.
287. Id. at 78.
288. Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
289. Id. at 148.
290. Id. at 149.
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ing met by all relationships, homosexual or heterosexual: among them
love, affection, personal intimacy and companionship. 91
Some may object that recognizing the relationships of unmarried
couples will dissolve a state's interest in promoting marriage. But the
state's interest can be looked at in two ways: 1) the state has an interest in
promoting marriage as against non-marriage; or 2) the state has an inter-
est in promoting marriage as against single-ness. The two are not the
same. The first promotes marriage strictly for marriage's sake. Any
other relational state-single or non-marital-is disfavored because it is
not marriage. In the second, the state promotes marriage because of the
bond of the marriage-the "legal obligations toward one another"2 92 em-
bodied in the marital contract which single people avoid by failing to get
married. In either case married people are favored and single people are
disfavored. The rationales differ in how they treat non-married, non-sin-
gle people.
The first treats non-married, non-single people as single people-
their relationship is not a marriage, so they are not a favored group; since
marriage is the only relationship the state favors, no other relationship is
adequate. The second treats non-married, non-single people like married
people on the condition they have undertaken legal obligations to one
another. On this rationale, the state does not favor relationships per se,
but relationships of a certain kind, those in which the partners are legally
obligated to one another. Marriage is an exemplar of this relational obli-
gation, but is not the only such relationship. Obligated but not-married
couples are clearly not "single" people avoiding relational obligations by
not getting married. It would be against the state's interest to treat them
as single people, since under this rationale the state's interest is in getting
people to form legal obligations to one another, and marriage is one way
of forming that legal obligation, but not the only way. For example, con-
tracts between unmarried couples under Marvin v. Marvin 293 may in-
clude obligations of support that are enforceable after the couple breaks
up. 294 The only restriction in Marvin is that the contract not rest on
sexual services as inseparable consideration.295 The discussion below will
demonstrate that courts sometimes assume married couples have obliga-
tions to one another which unmarried couples lack, yet fail to examine
291. Peplau, Research on Homosexual Couples: An Overview, 8 JOURNAL OF HOMOSEXU-
ALITY Winter, 1982, at 5 (citations omitted).
292. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259
(1988).
293. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1978).
294. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
295. Id.
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the express or implied contracts between unmarried partners to see if
those contracts include obligations between the partners that are
analagous to, or even greater than the obligations married couples take
on.
296
Another argument is that the state's consent to marriage is impor-
tant.29 v But whatever statutory protection the state may offer married
couples, that protection is in the name of promoting marriage. Again the
question must be asked, promoting marriage as against what? If the state
offers benefits to married couples, to the exclusion of nonmarital partners
with similar or identical legal obligations to one another, solely because
the former are married, then the state values marriage for itself, and has
an equally substantial interest in preventing divorce. The state has no
such interest.298 The laws permitting divorce suggest that the state's in-
terest lies with the relationship of the parties-the state has little, if any,
interest in requiring people to remain in bad marriages; the quality of the
relationship is important. Yet if people are forming good relationships
similar to marriages299 which are obviously important to them, how is
the state's consent relevant to the state's interest in promoting good rela-
tionships? If the only issue is that of bookkeeping, where is the state's
interest in prohibiting people such as gay and lesbian couples from form-
ing relationships with the state's bookkeeping procedure?
Marriages are by their nature social units. They have a clear and
pervasive influence in the public realm. By defining privacy with relation
to marriage,3  the state literally has the power to create the private
sphere. But marriage also implicates another, and broader state power:
the power to define "family."
3. What is a family?
Family... may be... a particular group of people related by
blood or marriage, or not related at all, who are living together
in the intimate and mutual interdependence of a single home or
household. °1
296. See infra notes 401-10, 422-51, and accompanying text.
297. See Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
298. Id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259 ("a detailed set of statutes governs
requirements for the entry into and termination of marriage") (emphasis added).
299. For example, the plaintiff in Elden described his relationship to his deceased partner as
"stable and significant and parallel to a marital relationship." Id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 255.
300. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
301. Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 185 Cal. 200, 207, 196 P.
257, 259 (1921).
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"'A family is a mommy and a daddy and their children. ,,302
The legal definition of "family" changes according to the context
being considered. 3  The American Bar Association Code of Judicial
Conduct provides a good example. The Canons use at least four different
definitions of the word "family" for different situations. Canon
3(C)(l)(c) provides that a judge should disqualify himself if his impartial-
ity might be questioned because "he, individually.., or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household has a financial interest in the pro-
ceeding. . . .,,3 The same Canon, in (C)(1)(d) suggests he should dis-
qualify himself if "he, or his spouse, or a person within the third degree
of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person" is party
to the proceeding or is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. 05 Canon 5
(C)(5) defines "family" for purposes of a judge's financial and business
dealings as any relative residing in the judge's household who is related
to the judge by blood or marriage, "or a person treated by a judge as a
member of his family who resides in his household."30 6 In the very next
subsection of that Canon the definition changes again, to include "a
spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or other relative or per-
son with whom the judge maintains a close familial relationship" within
the context of a judge acting as executor, administrator, trustee, or
guardian.30 7
The term "family" comes from the Latin familia, which denoted
any household members over whom the head of the Roman household
exercised his control, orpatriapotestas.°8 This source definition, with its
focus on those who live in the same household, corresponds with the
flexible modem concept of family evident in some parts of the Judicial
Code, as well as other contexts. 3 9 According to a 1982 California sur-
302. Footlick, What Happened To The Family? NEWSWEEK SPECIAL EDITION, Winter/
Spring 1990 at 18 (quoting Midge Decter).
303. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 543 (5th ed. 1979) ("The meaning of word 'family'
necessarily depends on field of law in which word is used, purpose intended to be accomplished
by its use, and facts and circumstances of each case."). See generally CITY OF LoS ANGELES
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, note 85, Supp. pt. I at S-1-27 (Report on Legal Definition of
Family).
304. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1972).
305. Id.
306. Id. Canon 5.
307. Id.
308. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 303, at 543. See id. for a definition of
'familiares regis."
309. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
See also PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY FOR CALIFORNIA: FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE JOINT
SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY, 10-11 (1989) (recommending definition of
"family" relying on function, rather than form).
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vey of 128 federal, state, county and city programs in California, 85%
provided services to household members who were not related by blood,
marriage or adoption.31° This administrative policy reflects a reality of
family life-that in the infinite variety of the human comedy people
sometimes form family relationships that do not fit bright-line defini-
tions. For example, handicapped individuals who experience an uncom-
monly high rate of unemployment and poverty311 often share housing to
save resources, 312 and because of their shared experiences and problems
form close relationships of mutual support very much like married
couples.313 Similar bonds may also arise with the handicapped individ-
ual's aide or attendant.31 4 Since a handicapped person loses benefits if he
or she marries a non-disabled person, such couples often avoid marriage
for the obvious financial reasons.315
The group that is most affected by restrictive definitions of family,
though, is the homosexual community. Not only are lesbians and gay
men discouraged by still-popular prejudice from even making their indi-
vidual presence known, they are prohibited by law from marrying.316
The benefits and legitimacy which flow from marriage are impossible for
gay and lesbian couples to attain. Yet committed same-sex couples do
exist, and in growing numbers. 317 Further, they are not content to accept
the manifest unfairness of a system of rules which proscribes their lives,
yet has never, in this country, acknowledged their existence, much less
solicited their participation in writing those rules.318
310. CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, Supp. pt. 1 at S-1 1-13.
311. Id. at 75.
312. Id.
313. Id. at S-394. See also id. at S-399-401 (marriage disincentives for people with
disabilities).
314. Id. at S-394.
315. Id. Public Hearing Testimony at 163 (testimony of Linda Knipps).
316. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983).
317. R. ACHTENBERG, PRESERVING AND PROTECTING THE FAMILIES OF GAY MEN AND
LESBIANS (1986) (published by Lesbian Rights Project, San Francisco, California); Wheeler,
2,000 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in Ceremony of Rights, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1987, at B1,
col. 2.
318. CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, Supp. pt. I at S-208:
Any policy regarding homosexuality will, of necessity, affect the most fundamental
aspects of the lives of millions of men and women who are gay and lesbian, and to
formulate such a policy without their input would be unconscionable and inhumane,
going against just about everything we as a society believe about the dignity and self-
determination of the individual, and his or her position with regard to the state. For
too long in this country laws have been passed against homosexuals, which depended
on a mostly unstated understanding that homosexuals were de facto criminals who
had no place in society, no moral or human worth, and no right to say anything to
the contrary, particularly with respect to government. Needless to say, homosexuals
did not contribute to the formulation of this policy.
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A particularly troublesome illustration of the problems that may
arise when assumptions about the word "family" are left unexamined
arises in the use of phrases such as "old-fashioned family values.13 19
Like "life-style, ' 321 this is a phrase which is seldom examined for con-
tent. It is often a concept used against homosexual people.321 But what
are family values? How is the issue of sexual orientation relevant to
whether a given person demonstrates or holds family values? While
there is probably no definitive list of such values, an article by Dr. Benja-
min Spock suggests what some of them may be: helpfulness, coopera-
tion, generosity, love, and, in general, the way partners treat one another
and their children. 22 While this is hardly an exhaustive list, it is an
example of what would happen if any list of "family values" is formu-
lated. Given specific values as a context; it is difficult to see how homo-
sexual people could be excluded from holding them. Values such as
generosity, love, cooperation, or commitment would hardly be exclusive
to heterosexual families. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a value that
would be held exclusively by heterosexuals, unless the ability to experi-
ence one's affectional relationships only with members of the opposite sex
is considered a "value." Again, the problem seems to be the assumptions
we make about families being only heterosexual.
As discussed below, the United States Supreme Court's discussions
of "family" indicate that states which define family relationships to en-
tirely exclude same-sex couples violate the constitutional guarantees of
intimate association, equal protection and due process.323 The cases dis-
cussed in the next section illustrate some of the ways states define or
construe "family" to create such an exclusion.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Because the vocabulary we have available to discuss family relation-
ships is inadequate to describe the territory signified by the words, those
who are unwilling to allow "family" to include gay and lesbian couples
can leave such couples no way to discuss their relationships. The cases
discussed in this section illustrate the battle being waged in the courts by
319. Footlick, What Happened To The Family?, NEWSWEEK SPECIAL EDITION Winter/
Spring 1990, at 17.
320. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
321. For example, the Traditional Values Coalition of Orange County, California, has taken
a leading role in invalidating laws which are viewed as pro-homosexual. Zanona, Gay Agenda
Takes Beating-Even in San Francisco, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, Al at col. 1.
322. Spock, "It's All Up to Us," NEWSWEEK SPECIAL EDITION Winter/Spring 1990, at
107.
323. See infra notes 686-719 and accompanying text.
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gay and lesbian couples to assert their existence in that protected realm,
couples whose relationships in every respect fall into the territory we call
family.
The cases fall into five broad categories: 1) torts; 2) property/lease
succession; 3) employment benefits; 4) child custody; and 5) medical
care. While the contexts differ, the problem in each case is the same-
how to account for a long-term, committed and stable relationship be-
tween two people who are not heterosexual.
A. Torts
The relational interest 324 directly affects recovery for two torts: neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has recently dealt with each in the context of
unmarried couples, with significant implications for gay and lesbian
couples.
1. Negligent infliction of emotional distress
In Dillon v. Legg,325 the California Supreme Court held that
tortfeasors owe a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endan-
gered by the defendant's conduct,326 and that the foreseeable risk may be
an emotional one.327 The Court formulated a three part test to deter-
mine whether liability was reasonably foreseeable: 1) the plaintiff's loca-
tion-the nearer to the injury, the more foreseeable the risk; 2) the time
the plaintiff learned of the injury-the more immediate, the more foresee-
able; and 3) the plaintiff's relationship to the victim-in the Court's
words, "whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con-
trasted with the absence of any relationship or the presence of only a
distant relationship.
328
The third criterion is presumptively met in any of the traditional
family relationships: spouse;329 sibling;330 grandparents. 331  Recovery
has also been allowed in a broader family context-a child who wit-
nessed an automobile strike his stepfather's mother; 332 a foster mother
who witnessed doctors negligently administer a fatal dose of glucose so-
324. See supra notes 274-91 and accompanying text.
325. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
326. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
327. Id. at 739-40, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
328. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
329. See Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 157 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
330. See Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982).
331. See Genzer v. City of Mission, 666 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
332. Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 408, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (1974).
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lution to her foster child.333
Courts did not uniformly grant relief to non-married couples. For
example, in Drew v. Drake 331 the California Court of Appeal denied re-
covery to a woman who had been living with a man for three years prior
to his injury. 335 Recovery was allowed, though, in Ledger v. Tippitt,
3 36
where an unmarried couple had been living together for two years.3 37 In
Ledger, a stranger stabbed the woman's lover in her presence after a mi-
nor auto accident. 338 The court held that it was foreseeable as a matter
of law that the woman in the car witnessing the stabbing was the victim's
loved one who would suffer severe emotional distress when her lover died
in her armS.
339
The California Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict be-
tween Drew and Ledger in Elden v. Sheldon,34I by overruling Ledger.341
In Elden, an unmarried heterosexual couple were involved in an auto
accident caused by defendant Sheldon. 342 Elden's partner was thrown
from the car, and later died.343 Elden sued Sheldon for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress and loss of consortium.
344
While voicing concern that unmarried couples might be "bound by
emotional ties as strong as those that bind formally married partners,
'345
and that the emotional injury to the physically non-damaged partner
could be "as devastating as that suffered by a member of the immediate
family, ' 3 46 the court could see no "principled distinction between an un-
married cohabitant who claims to have a de facto marriage relationship"
and "de facto siblings, parents, grandparents or children, '347 and thus
denied recovery to the entire class of unmarried couples.348 It should be
stressed here that the court was not engaging in statutory interpretation
333. Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 576-77, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 722
(1976), disapproved on other grounds, Baxter v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d 461, 466 n.4, 563 P.2d
871, 874 n.4, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 n.4 (1977).
334. 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
335. Id. at 557, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
336. 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1985).
337. Id. at 630, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
338. Id. at 631, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
339. Id. at 646, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
340. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
341. Id. at 277, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
342. Id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
343. Id., 250 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 273, 758 P.2d. at 585-86, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
346. Id. at 277, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 280, 759 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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in referring to the marital relationship. The issue was purely one of de-
ciding what the Dillon court meant when it required a close relationship.
Whatever reasons people may have for forming relationships with
de facto siblings, parents, grandparents or children, the de facto marriage
relationship is qualitatively different in that it is the primary relationship
the couple would form. The third Dillon requirement for recovery con-
trasts the presence of a close relationship with "the absence of any rela-
tionship, or the presence of only a distant relationship. ' 349 Denying
recovery for injury to a person's primary life partner, particularly when
the plaintiff meets the other two Dillon requirements of physical presence
and temporal immediacy to the injury350 is more than just a hard rule-it
effectively dispenses with Dillon's assertion that "no immutable rule can
establish the extent of [a tortfeasor's] obligation for every circumstance
of the future.,
35 1
The harshness of Elden is most clear in the case of gay and lesbian
couples. After Elden, the California statute barring same-sex marriage
3 52
will preclude same-sex couples from any tort recovery for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. 353 Even in areas which are well-known to
have disproportionately high populations of gay and lesbian residents,
354
the foreseeability element of the tort is irrelevant.355 Justice Broussard
points out in his dissent that "the categorical exclusion of same-sex
couples particularly highlights the injustice of an approach that recog-
nized only those commitments ratified by the state.
356
The case of Coon v. Joseph 357 is illustrative. Gary Coon and his life
partner, Ervin, attempted to board a San Francisco bus.358 The driver
denied Coon entry, and when Ervin entered, the driver struck him in the
face in full view of Coon, and verbally abused Ervin. 359 The court of
appeal held that Coon had failed to state a cause of action for negligent
349. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis added).
350. Id.
351. Id. See also Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 280, 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting).
352. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983).
353. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 282 n.2, 758 P.2d at 588 n.2, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.2 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
354. Such areas include the Castro district of San Francisco, West Hollywood, California
and Greenwich Village in New York, among others.
355. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 282, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
356. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 282 n.2, 758 P.2d at 592 n.2, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.2 (Broussard,
J., dissenting).
357. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1987).
358. Id. at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
359. Id.
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infliction of emotional distress36° because he failed to meet the third Dil-
lon requirement of a "close relationship" to the injured party.36' The
court reasoned that close relationships did not include "friends or house-
mates. 362 In fact, the majority opinion was only able to refer to Ervin as
Coon's "friend. ' '36 3 This is at odds with Coon's description of Ervin as
his "exclusive life partner.
' '364
The difference between these characterizations is at the heart of the
opinion. The court cites Prosser & Keeton on Torts to the effect that tort
recovery should not be extended to "every bystander shocked at an acci-
dent, and every distant relative of the person injured, as well as all his
friends. ' 365 Again, the third Dillon requirement is a "close relationship
as contrasted with the absence of any relationship, or the presence of
only a distant relationship. ' 366 Clearly Coon was more than a "by-
stander" or "distant relative." The court's characterization of the rela-
tionship as that of friends or housemates is wholly inadequate to describe
the couple's understanding of their own relationship to one another.
This relationship was an exclusive lifetime commitment.367 The court's
inability to view the relationship as the parties viewed it allowed it to
impose an extremely narrow interpretation of the legal standard in-
volved, that the parties have a close relationship, 368 and trivialized what
the parties, themselves, viewed as their primary lifetime relationship.
The court, in Minow's words, "treats its own perspective as un-
problematic" and makes the perspective of the couple "invisible," put-
ting it "beyond discussion.
'369
In denying recovery, the court invoked the spectre of "inconsistent
results, 3 70 dependent (ironically, in this case) on "personal, completely
subjective viewpoints of the trier of fact. '371 Elden, too, relied on the
"difficult problems of proof"'372 leading to "mischief and inconsistent re-
360. Id. at 1277, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1275, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (citation omitted).
363. Id. at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1274, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBnS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 366 (5th ed. 1984)).
366. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
367. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
368. Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
369. Minow, supra note 196, at 53.
370. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1276, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
371. Id.
372. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 276, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (citation omitted).
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sults."' 3 But this shifts the focus away from foreseeability. As presiding
judge White pointed out in his dissent in Coon, "In contemporary society
(and particularly in San Francisco) it is foreseeable a homosexual rela-
tionship might exist. Such a relationship may be significant enough to
meet the third Dillon requirement." 74 In neither Coon nor Elden did the
majority "conclude that the plaintiff was unrelated or distantly related to
his injured lover," the standard the California high court, not the legisla-
ture, had set in Dillon. 75 A per se rule of marriage, in effect dispenses
with that requirement by giving marriage an irrebuttable presumption of
closeness that no other voluntary adult relationship may even attempt to
claim.
While Elden appears to treat all unmarried couples alike for the pur-
poses of the tort, its ultimate effect is far more burdensome on homosex-
ual couples. In states like California, homosexual couples cannot "in any
case choose marriage," '376 and are thus "precluded from ever recovering
for negligent infliction of emotional distress." '377
2. Loss of consortium
The court's reasons in Elden for denying recovery to unmarried
couples for intentional infliction of emotional distress are reiterated in
the second part of the opinion, dealing with loss of consortium. 78 In
1974, in the case of Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. , the California
Supreme Court held that a married person whose spouse has been in-
jured by the negligence of a third party may recover for the loss of conju-
gal society, comfort, affection, companionship and sexual relations.38°
Originally, the tort was available only to husbands, and was primar-
ily designed to protect his property interest in his wife's services,38
though his "intangible interest in his wife's company" '382 was also inci-
dentally protected. For years the California Supreme Court refused to
373. Id. (citing Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 637-39, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 820-22
(1985)).
374. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1284, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (White, P.J., dissenting).
375. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 280, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
376. Id. at 282 n.2, 758 P.2d at 588 n.2, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.2 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
377. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1283, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (White, P.J., dissenting).
378. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 277, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
379. 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974).
380. Id. at 404-05, 525 P.2d at 686, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 779-80.
381. See Note, supra note 274, at 1469.
382. Id. at 1468-69 n.5.
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allow the cause of action to wives, 38 3 holding to its position that it was
the legislature's duty to grant the relief.384 The legislature never acted,
and in Rodriguez the court recanted and allowed recovery to both hus-
bands and wives. s While Rodriguez was clearly in the context of the
marriage relationship, the language is equally poignant for any couple:
An important aspect of consortium is thus the moral support
each spouse gives the other through the triumph and despair of
life. A severely disabled husband may well need all the emo-
tional strength he has just to survive the shock of his injury,
make the agonizing adjustment to his new and drastically re-
stricted world, and preserve his mental health through the long
years of frustration ahead. He will often turn inwards, de-
manding more solace for himself than he can give to others.
Accordingly, the spouse of such a man cannot expect him to
share the same concern for her problems that she experienced
before his accident. As several of the cases have put it, she is
transformed from a happy wife into a lonely nurse. Yet she is
entitled to enjoy the companionship and moral support that
marriage provides no less than its sexual side, and in both cases
no less than her husband. If she is deprived of either by reason
of a negligent injury to her husband, the loss is hers alone ....
[T]his is an example of a single tortious act which harms two
people by virtue of their relationship to each other.38 6
This passage not only expressed the need of the spouse for recovery, but
revealed the social policy in granting that recovery-a validation of the
relationship which encourages the partners to stay together through the
difficult period of adjustment. The state benefits if the physically non-
injured partner remains by the side of the injured party rather than aban-
doning the relationship, leaving the injured partner to recover and adjust
for him or herself. Moreover, it is the tortfeasor's responsibility to pay
the cost suffered by the relationship.
The court in Elden states that denying tort recovery to unmarried
couples furthers the state's interest in promoting marriage because
"[fjormally married couples are granted significant rights and bear im-
portant responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by
383. Id. at 1469.
384. Id.
385. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 408, 525 P.2d 669, 686, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 782 (1974).
386. Id. at 405-06, 525 P.2d at 684, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 780 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
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those who cohabit without marriage. '  These include obligations such
as the duty of spousal contract rights and support.3 8 8 This illustrates the
thesis that courts may easily assume unmarried couples do not bear legal
obligations toward one another.389 Here, the court did not examine the
couple's relationship to see if there were any legal obligations between
the partners. The court merely noted the couple were unmarried, and
thus, should not be permitted to recover for injuries to their partners "to
the same extent as those who undertake these responsibilities. 3 90 This
assumption fails for two reasons.
First, the issue is not the "extent" of recovery-the court does not
allow unmarried couples to recover any amount for negligent infliction of
emotional distress or loss of consortium. In the case where a tortfeasor
negligently causes serious, permanent damage to a person's lifetime non-
marital relationship by causing damage to the person's partner, the
physically non-damaged partner has no cause of action against the
tortfeasor.3 91 The couple is treated as two individual people with no sig-
nificant relationship at all. The court refers to the state's interest in pro-
moting "the responsibilities of marriage, "392 but does not offer even the
most cursory analysis of how limiting recovery to the couple would pro-
mote marriage.39 ' In any case this analysis is irrelevant for gay and les-
bian couples who can not marry if they wish to,394 and suggests a world
in which they do not exist.
More important, a broader construction of "family" would not deni-
grate marriage's status. As Justice Broussard suggested in Elden, under
a broader rule protecting the relational interest,
[m]arriage would maintain its preferential status since married
persons are presumed to be "closely related" for the purpose of
Dillon. Rather, the proposal is merely to elevate unmarried co-
habitants to a neutral status by permitting them to prove on a
case-by- case basis that their relationship is equivalent in all rel-
387. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
388. Id.
389. See infra notes 422-51 and accompanying text for another illustration of this thesis.
390. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
391. Id. at 278, 758 P.2d at 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
392. Id., 258 P.2d at 588, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
393. As the dissent pointed out,
[i]t is difficult to fathom how granting relief to a person who is already injured, re-
gardless of marital status, will detract from society's interest in marriage. Presuma-
bly, a person who would not otherwise choose to marry would not be persuaded to
do so in order to assure his or her legal standing in a future personal injury action
Id. at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
394. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1278, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (Barry-Deal, J., concurring).
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evant respects to a good marriage and equally deserving of legal
protection.395
The difference in judicial perception here is marked. The majority views
marriage as the only relationship worth giving judicial recognition as be-
ing close. Justice Broussard, on the other hand, sees commitment as the
test, and marital commitment as strong, even irrefutable, but not exclu-
sive, evidence of commitment. The proposed recovery is an attempt by
the group of committed, but unmarried couples to have their commit-
ment recognized. As noted in the dissent, the state's "policy in favor of
marriage ... does not imply a corresponding policy against nonmarital
relationships.
396
The second problem with the court's assessment of the state's inter-
est in promoting marriage is the court's assertion that the holding in
Marvin v. Marvin 397 would not lead to a different conclusion. 398 Accord-
ing to the court in Elden, Marvin only permits the enforcement of ex-
press or implied contracts between unmarried couples relating to a
division of property or support.
39 9
Even given that this is a somewhat constricted reading of Marvin,4"
the Elden court cites exactly these two factors to support its rationale
that marital relationships are superior to non-marital relationships.4 °0
Even within the most constricted reading of "support" it is a duty to
support one's partner that is similar to the spousal marital support which
the court points to as supposedly making marriage superior to cohabita-
tion.' 2 As spelled out in the California Civil Code, a married couple's
obligations to one another are "obligations of mutual respect, fidelity and
support.'' 3 Mutual respect, fidelity and support are hardly unique to
marital relationships, yet California statutory law requires no more of
married couples, and there is no reason to believe unmarried couples may
395. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 281, 758 P.2d at 591, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Broussard, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).
396. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting Norman v. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 14, 663 P.2d 904, 909, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 143 (Brous-
sard, J., dissenting) (1983)).
397. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2l 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
398. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 279, 758 P.2d at 590, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
399. Id.
400. The Marvin court held that "express agreements [between unmarried couples] will be
enforced." 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court placed no
restrictions on the terms of the contract except that it may not rest on "unlawful meretricious
consideration." Id.
401. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
402. Id.
403. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5100 (West 1983).
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not also contract for them with one another.4°4
It is, in fact, insulting to think that unmarried couples who have
indicated a contract with one another for mutual trust, support and obli-
gation do not have, for one another, mutual respect or fidelity in addition
to their clear contractual obligation of support. The court noted that the
plaintiff presented "no convincing reason why cohabiting unmarried
couples who do not bear.., legal obligations toward one another, should
be permitted to recover for injuries to their partners to the same extent as
those who undertake these responsibilities.""4  But by framing the issue
this way, the court apparently assumes either that the class of unmarried
cohabiting couples is coextensive with the class of couples who have not
undertaken legal responsibilities to one another, or else that Marvin con-
tracts do not include responsibilities and obligations between the part-
ners. The first is clearly wrong; while it is unclear in Elden whether the
parties had any legally enforceable obligations to one another, the part-
ners in cases like Coon apparently had such obligations.4 6 As to the
second, in Marvin itself, there is no bar to the terms of the contract ex-
cept that it may not rest on the inseparable consideration of meretricious
sexual services."°7 Under Marvin as written, couples may design a con-
tract with mutual obligations identical to those in a marriage contract.
Nor does the court in Elden anywhere indicate a reading of Marvin
that would make such contracts unenforceable. The court merely as-
sumes that unmarried partners would not wish to undertake such obliga-
tions, and are, by refusing to marry, seeking to avoid those obligations."°
Even if this were true for heterosexual couples who do not choose to
marry," 9 it is not true for gay and lesbian couples who may not enter
404. The Elden court also argues that the state's consent to the marriage contract is also
important. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258. As discussed
above, supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text, this argument only makes sense for same-
sex couples if they can choose to marry, which in California, they cannot at present. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983).
405. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 274, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (emphasis added).
406. Coon, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1272, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 874. Other cases, such as Hinman v.
Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412 (1985)
leave no doubt, by stating the partners had a "covenant of mutual economic support." Id.
407. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
408. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The assumption is
clear in the court's equative wording: "cohabiting unmarried couples, who do not bear...
legal obligations toward one another ...."
409. It is not at all clear from the the facts in Elden, id. at 269, 758 P.2d at 582, 250 Cal.
Rptr. at 255, or other cases that the couples were seeking to avoid any obligations. See, e.g.,
MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr.
823 (1984) (unmarried cohabitant left job to remain with partner who had been relocated);
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into the marriage contract, yet wish to.4
10
Elden is nevertheless notable because it attempts to explore why we
value the marriage contract, rather than merely asserting the state's in-
terest in promoting marriage with no further analysis. As the court
pointed out, marriage is important because of the rights and duties re-
quired in the marital contract.411 As discussed previously, those duties
have value in an ethical and personal sense.412 Gay and lesbian couples
who see that value and desire the relationship for themselves are increas-
ingly involving themselves in activities such as holy union ceremonies,
413
political activism 14 and private contracts4" 5 which indicate how strongly
this issue affects them. There truly is no convincing reason "cohabiting
unmarried couples [without legal responsibilities to one another] should
be permitted to recover ... to the same extent as [couples] who under-
take these responsibilities., 416  But the Elden court offers no reason
couples who have undertaken legal duties and obligations under Marvin
contracts should be treated differently than those who have contracted
for identical or similar duties and obligations under marital contracts. In
Justice Broussard's words, "[w]hile the marital relationship is accompa-
nied by a well-defined set of legal rights and obligations, the law also
protects analagous rights and obligations voluntarily undertaken by un-
married cohabitants."417 Even this language hedges more than it needs
to: the rights and obligations for which unmarried couples may contract
do not need to be "analogous" to those of married couples. They may be
identical to those required under state law.
Again, the Elden court was not deciding a case of statutory interpre-
tation, but one of tort injury. As the court learned in the history of one
of the very torts before it, loss of consortium, the legislature does not
Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134
(1983) (same).
410. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 520-21, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 410, 412 (1985) (gay employee who had entered into covenant of mutual economic sup-
port with lifemate; partners "would marry if they were not prohibited from doing so").
411. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
412. See supra notes 277-91 and accompanying text.
413. Dart, Bay Area Episcopal Delegates Urge Church to Bless Gay Relationships, L.A.
Times, Oct. 29, 1988, pt. II at 6, col. 1; Wheeler, 2,000 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in Cere-
mony of Rights, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1987, Metro at Bl, col. 2.
414. Gutis, Family Redefines Itself, and Now the Law Follows, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989,
pt. 4 at 6, col. 1 ("Gay rights organizations are leading the push for changes in government
regulations defining the family."), Wheeler, supra note 413.
415. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 520-21, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
416. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
417. Id. at 282, 758 P.2d at 592, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
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always act to provide fair and adequate tort recovery for its citizens. The
Court waited seventeen years for the legislature to provide wives the
cause of action for loss of consortium that their husbands had418 and
finally had to provide the cause of action themselves.419 As the Elden
dissent noted, the majority abdicated the Court's responsibility for the
upkeep of the common law. 20
B. Property/Lease Succession
Another area in which courts will become increasingly involved is
disputes over the property rights of gay and lesbian couples. Because
homosexual people are not at present able to form any legally cognizable
relationship which would dictate property interest by default, and since
gay men and lesbians sometimes do not expressly contract for property
rights when they form relationships, litigation in this area is almost
inevitable.
The failure of legislators to address the fact that gay men and lesbi-
ans make lifetime commitments to one another has created a mass of
such litigation in New York City. In less than two years, six reported
cases dealt with the status of gay and lesbian couples in one legal area
alone: the right of legal succession to an apartment upon the death of the
named tenant.421
In the landmark case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates,422 New York's
highest court held that same-sex couples are protected by a provision in
the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations which prohibits land-
lords from evicting surviving members of a named tenant's family who
live with the tenant, in the event the tenant dies.423 The decision is the
first by any state high court to deal directly with the status of gay and
lesbian families.
Miguel Braschi and Leslie Blanchard had lived in a rent-controlled
apartment in New York City for eleven years when, in 1986, Blanchard
418. Note, supra note 274, at 1469-70.
419. Id.
420. Elden, 46 Cal. 3d at 286, 758 P.2d at 594, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 266-67 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
421. See Koppelman v. O'Keeffe, 140 Misc. 2d 828, 535 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Term
1988); Raynes Assoc. Ltd. v. Augresani, 530 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988); Yorkshire
Towers v. Harpster, 134 Misc. 2d 384, 510 N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1986) (incorporating
two other cases, Bren-EI Realty Co. v. Coleman and Thompson Realty Co. v. Baker); Two
Assoc. v. Brown, 131 Misc. 2d 986, 502 N.Y.S.2d 604 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 127 A.D.2d
173, 513 N.Y.S.2d 966 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
422. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
423. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
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died.424 The landlord attempted to evict Braschi, who was not named in
the lease.425 This eviction would have permitted the landlord to place
the apartment on the market under the less-stringent Rent Stabilization
law.426 Braschi moved for an injunction and a declaration that he was a
member of Blanchard's family, and thus that he had a right to continue
living in the apartment under the stricter rent-control law.427 That law
provides that the surviving spouse of a deceased tenant, or "some other
member of the deceased tenant's family who has been living with the
tenant" may continue to live in the apartment under the protection of
rent control.428 The word "family" is not defined in the regulation.429
A New York Supreme Court had granted the injunction, finding
that the relationship of Blanchard and Braschi fulfilled "any definitional
criteria of the word 'family.'"430 The appellate division reversed, hold-
ing that the statute provided eviction protection only to already legally
recognized family relationships.431 The court of appeals reversed.432
The plurality on the high court found that the regulation's protec-
tions "should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history,
but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family life."43
More important, the opinion viewed unmarried partners whose relation-
ship is long-term, and is characterized by traits such as emotional or fi-
nancial commitments and interdependence as located within our
society's traditional concept of family.434 Finally, the opinion overcame
the most significant obstacle to viewing the relationship as the couple
views it by rejecting the position that the parties were simply
"roommates. , 435
To determine whether such a relationship is, in fact, familial, the
court looked to four factors: 1) exclusivity and longevity of the relation-
ship; 2) the level of emotional and financial commitment; 3) the manner
in which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held their
relationship out to society (and, presumably, friends and other family
members); and 4) the reliance the parties place on one another for daily
424. Id., 543 N.E.2d at 50-51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
425. Id, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
426. See id. at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
427. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
428. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 2204.6(d) (McKinney 1987).
429. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
430. Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 51, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
434. Id., 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
435. Id. at 212 n.4, 543 N.E.2d at 54 n.4, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 n.4.
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family services.436 The opinion specifically emphasized that while these
factors are helpful, "the presence or absence of one or more of them is
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced by
the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in
the final analysis, control." '437
Measured against these criteria, Braschi and Blanchard were clearly
family members. They had lived together for more than a decade, 8
were regarded by friends and family as spouses,4 39 and attended family
functions together as a couple."' Even the building's superintendant
and doormen viewed the two men as a couple." In addition, the apart-
ment was clearly Braschi's home.' 2 The men also had joint checking
and savings accounts and joint credit cards." 3 Finally, the court noted
Braschi had Blanchard's power of attorney, was beneficiary in
Blanchard's life insurance policy, and was primary legatee and co-execu-
tor of Blanchard's estate.4 "
The two-judge dissent argued that the plurality's test was "unwork-
able ... [and] subject to abuse,"" and that the only individuals pro-
tected as family members are those who are related by blood, marriage or
adoption." 6 The problem in the Braschi dissent is, ultimately, the same
436. Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790. While the opinion did not specify
what "daily family services" are, they could include, among other things, shopping, house-
keeping, cooking, paying household bills, making social arrangements, caring for children, and
caring for one another.








445. Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons, J., dissenting).
446. Id. at 221, 543 N.E.2d at 60, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (Simons, J., dissenting). The dissent
implied that these factors are more easily ascertained than the majority's unworkable ones.
This is not necessarily true. A general criterion no more specific than "related by blood" can
include a myriad of geneological possibilities, many requiring at least as much court time and
subjective proof as the test relied on by the plurality. See, eg., In re Wendell's Will, 143 Misc.
480, 257 N.Y.S. 87 (Sun. Ct. of N.Y. 1932) (over sixteen hundred people claimed to be related
in various degrees to decedent).
Moreover, even the facts involving a marriage are hardly immune from question in the
courts. In Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974), a husband was
married to two women, and the question arose of which was his legal wife. In Estate of Leslie,
37 Cal. 3d 186, 689 P:2d 133, 207 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1984), a marriage in Mexico had not been
recorded as required by Mexican law, and the legitimacy of the marriage in California was
questioned. In Wagner v. County of Imperial, 145 Cal. App. 3d 980, 193 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1983),
a wife believed she was validly married to her husband, but their vows had never been solem-
nized as required by law. This is not to say that category determinations by legislatures are to
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difficulty the California Supreme Court had in Elden v. Sheldon. 7 In
both cases, judges discuss a preferred form of family structure as impos-
ing "certain legal obligations" on the parties," 8 and assume that relation-
ships not meeting the formal definition do not include the necessary
obligations." 9 Again, it must be stressed that some unmarried couples,
by virtue of their relationship to one another, as well as more blatant
indications of contractual and affectional ties, may have undertaken the
very same legal obligations to support one another which characterize
ties such as marriage. A bare assertion that family members have "cer-
tain" obligations to one another, without elaboration, paired with the
assumption that partners like Braschi and Blanchard do not have such
obligations, is a covert way of dismissing the same-sex relationship.
Given the facts of this case, there is little, if any question that Braschi
and Blanchard's relationship contained every kind of mutual obligation
found in the formalized family relationships preferred by the dissent.450
A contrary assumption otherwise ignores existing New York law, which
clearly permits Marvin-type contracts between unmarried partners, in
which such obligations of support may be found.45  The difference be-
tween the plurality and the dissent in Braschi is that the plurality chose
to look for those obligations; the dissent did not.
C. Employment Benefits
In the area of employment benefits, too, gay and lesbian couples feel
the effects of a system that was designed without them in mind. Two
cases from California demonstrate the problem.
In Donovan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board,4 52 Earl Dono-
van, the long-term lover of a Los Angeles County deputy district attor-
ney, sought review of a decision by the Worker's Compensation Appeals
be ignored. On the contrary, in New York, the legislature had determined the category to be
protected: family members. Given the many ways "family" can be defined, ajudicial narrow-
ing is arguably more violative of legislative intent than the broader reading the Braschi plural-
ity uses. People sometimes fall through the cracks of categories like "marriage" or "blood
relative" just as they sometimes fall through cracks in a category like "family." When that
happens, justice would seem to require a court to examine the facts and, if possible, fill in the
crack.
447. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
448. See id. at 275, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259; Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 218, 543
N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
449. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 221, 543 N.E.2d at 57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
450. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (Simons, J., dissenting).
451. See Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1980).
452. 138 Cal. App. 3d 323, 187 Cal. Rptr. 869 (1982).
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Board (WCAB) that he was not entitled to the death benefits of his de-
ceased lover on an issue not related to homosexuality.453 The court of
appeal remanded the case to the WCAB4 54 and in resolving the underly-
ing issue in favor of Donovan, the court found that the WCAB would be
required to determine whether Donovan was a dependent of the deceased
state employee in order to recover under California Labor Code section
3503455 which defined "dependent" as a "good faith ... member of the
family or household of the employee."4 6 On remand, the WCAB found
that Donovan was such a dependent member of the household, because
he had been living with the employee for twenty-seven years.457
Two years later, however, the court of appeals decided Hinman v.
Department of Personnel Administration.as8 Unlike the broad definition
in the Labor Code, the Hinman court was construing a benefit scheme
under the State Employees' Dental Care Act (Act).459 The Act contains
no definition of "family' 46° but the Department of Personnel Adminis-
tration (DPA), which administers the benefits plans for state employees,
had incorporated the definition of "family" from the immediately preced-
ing Health Care Act46 1 which defined "family member" as an employee's
spouse and unmarried children.462
The plaintiff, Boyce Hinman, enrolled his lover, with whom he had
been living for twelve years, for coverage under Hinman's dental plan.4 63
The DPA deleted the lover's name.464 After complying with a grievance
procedure, Hinman petitioned the court for a writ of mandate requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief.4 65 The DPA demurred and the trial
court sustained the demurrer.466
On appeal, Hinman claimed unlawful discrimination on two theo-
ries: denial of equal protection under the state constitition, and violation
of state Executive Order B-54-79, which prohibited discrimination in ex-
453. Id. at 325, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71.
454. Id. at 329, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
455. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3503 (West 1989).
456. Id. See Donovan, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 328, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
457. Oliver, Homosexual Lover Awarded Death Benefits, L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at Bi,
col. 1.
458. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
459. Id. at 521-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
460. Id. at 523, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
461. Id. (referring to Public Employees' Medical and Hospital Care Act § 22754).
462. Id.
463. Id. at 520-21, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
464. Id. at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
465. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412-13.
466. Id.
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ecutive branch departments, boards and commissions based on sexual
orientation.467
The court appears to have decided the case in the first paragraph of
the facts. Noting that Hinman referred to his lover as his "family part-
ner"'4 68 the court said it would "decline to use the term, as it carries a
conclusory implication of family relationship, yet is not established by
blood relationship or the operation of law." '469 Throughout the opinion,
the court refused to view voluntary family relationships between mem-
bers of the same sex as legally cognizable. Whenever the court used the
term "family" in a homosexual context, the court placed the word in
quotation marks.47 This grammatical wincing demonstrates how wide
the perceptual chasm was between the plaintiff's view of his relationship
and the court's view.471
This was not the only indication of the court's unwillingness to rec-
ognize the relationships of homosexual people. When the court asserted
the state's interest in promoting marriage as the public policy which sup-
ported a decision to give benefits to spouses or family members, the court
viewed homosexual people as "simply a part of the larger class of unmar-
ried persons,"472 and pointed out with apparent bewilderment that the
"plaintiffs are not similarly situated to heterosexual state employees with
spouses. They are similarly situated to other unmarried state employ-
ees."4 73 The implication is that if homosexual people want these benefits,
they should get married. But who should they get married to? The
court, in its refusal to see that homosexual couples have different
problems from those of unmarried heterosexual couples, pointed out that
a marriage license provides a
verifiable method of proof .... [N]umerous problems of stan-
dards and difficulties of proof would arise if we imposed upon
an administrative agency the function of deciding which rela-
tionships merited treatment equivalent to the treatment af-
467. Id. at 520, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
468. Id. at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
469. Id. at 520 n.2, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412 n.2.
470. "The distinction plaintiffs argue here is one between heterosexual families and homo-
sexual 'families.' We are unable to establish the nature of a homosexual 'family' .... " Id. at
526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416; "[T]he unmarried 'family' partners of homosexual state employees
.. " Id. at 531, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 420 (Blease, A.J., concurring).
471. Lesbians and gay men often find themselves within such quotation marks. Columnist
George Will has recently worried about colleges which try to enforce "officially approved
thinking about race, 'sexual preference' and other items of liberal orthodoxy." Will, U.S.
Campuses Are Putting Sensitivity Police on Patrol, L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, at M7, col. 1.
472. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
473. Id (emphasis in original).
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forded those with formal marriages. The inevitable questions
would include issues such as the facts deemed relevant, the
length of the relationship, the parties' eventual plans as to mar-
riage, and the sincerity of their beliefs as to whether they
should ever marry.474
This is precisely the situation the court had been in two years earlier
when it sent Donovan back to the WCAB, and which the Board had
resolved.475 Significantly, the quoted material is from Norman v. Unem-
ployment Insurance Appeals Board,476 a case denying benefits to an un-
married heterosexual couple.477 What are the plaintiffs in Hinman to
make of the argument that they should be denied benefits because the
state isn't sure of their "eventual plans as to marriage""47 or "their beliefs
as to whether they should ever marry"?479 More important, what are
they to make of that argument in light of the fact that they have publicly
stated to the court that "they would marry if they were not prohibited
from doing so?"48 How often do supposedly "similarly situated" heter-
osexual couples claim they would marry if they were not prohibited from
doing so?
Again, the court spoke, like the California Supreme Court in Elden
v. Sheldon4"' in the vocabulary of "familial obligations." '482 In fact, the
court cited MacGregor v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,483 a
case in which the California Supreme Court explicitly declined to hold
that legal marriage was a prerequisite to recovery of unemployment in-
surance where "other indices of compelling familial obligations" ex-
isted.4 84 The Hinman court, in its zeal to deny Hinman's recovery, read
MacGregor as applying only to relationships between parents and chil-
dren-an unnecessarily cramped reading of that case, since MacGregor
can easily be read as requiring ascertainable obligations between family
members, and that obligations parents have to their children are merely
474. Id. at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (quoting Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.,
34 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 663 P.2d 904, 910, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 140 (1983)).
475. Oliver, Homosexual Lover Awarded Death Benefits, L.A. Times, Dec. 13, 1983, at B1,
col. 1.
476. 34 Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983).
477. Id. at 10, 663 P.2d at 910, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
478. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
481. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988); see supra notes 400-07 and
accompanying text.
482. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
483. 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984).
484. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418 (citations omitted).
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an example of such ascertainable obligations. Under that reading, and
respecting the California Supreme Court's discussion in Elden about ob-
ligations485 the relationship between Hinman and his partner is manifest.
Not only had they been living together for more than a decade as part-
ners, they owned their own home together, had their assets in a joint
bank account, were primary beneficiaries in one another's wills and life
insurance policies, and had "entered into a covenant of mutual economic
support. '486 This last, quite specifically, would stand as an enforceable
contract under Marvin, legally imposing certain obligations between the
partners. This is "verifiable" proof that the relationship is not one of
"roommates, acquaintances or companions, ' 487 and if it is not akin to a
marital relationship, it is difficult to see how a marital relationship would
be more intricately intertwined.
In concluding that the plaintiffs had not been discriminated against,
either on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status, 488 the Hinman
court revealed its central misunderstanding of the issue it was asked to
address. The court pointed out that the plaintiffs' "real quarrel is with
the California legislature if they wish to legitimate the status of a homo-
sexual partner. ' 489 In stating that Civil Code section 4100 defines mar-
riage as a contract between a man and a woman, the court concluded
"we cannot change that law here.""49 But changing the law was not the
issue in the case. The court was being asked to apply an equal protection
analysis to a statutory definition of "family" that did not include gay or
lesbian couples.49 1 While it was true that Hinman and his partner would
marry if they were not prohibited from doing 80,492 they were not asking
the court to marry them, they were asking the court to examine the legis-
lative definition of family under the state's equal protection guarantee to
see if it could withstand constitutional scrutiny.4 9 3 By equating "mar-
riage" and "family," the court blinded itself to the broader question of
family relationships which the plaintiffs had asked it to consider.
485. See supra notes 400-07 and accompanying text.
486. Hlinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 520-21, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
487. Id. at 528, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
488. Id. at 531, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20.
489. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
490. Id., 213 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
491. Id. at 519, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
492. Id. at 521, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
493. Id. at 519, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
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D. Child Custody
It is no accident that this section contains, by far, the most cases.49 4
The current policy of "promoting" relationships only for heterosexuals,
coupled with the policy of encouraging homosexual' people to deny their
orientation and act as if they were heterosexual, quite naturally results in
homosexual people who find themselves in opposite-sex marriages. This
affects not only the homosexual spouse, but the heterosexual one, too,
who is essentially the victim of a deception society requests of its homo-
sexual members. To expect these marriages to end in anything other
than divorce is only one example of how we prefer to deal with the issue
of homosexuality by trying to pretend it does not exist, with a cost borne
not only by the couples whose marriages end in failure, but by any chil-
dren they may have.
1. Cases ruling against gay and lesbian couples
As argued above,495 courts may apply sodomy statutes in a way that
discriminates against homosexual people even if the sodomy statute is
facially neutral regarding sexual orientation. One of those applications is
in child custody cases in which gay or lesbian couples have formed a
home after the divorce of one or both partners, and file for custody of
either or both partners' children. If they were allowed to get married, of
course, any sexual activity with their partner would be presumed to be
protected.496 Because gay and lesbian couples are not allowed to achieve
that relational privacy, their sexual relationship is always open to scru-
tiny and condemnation that has no parallel for heterosexuals. Concomi-
tantly, no state discussed in this section has relied on its sodomy statutes
as the principal reason for denying a heterosexual couple child
custody.497
494. This Comment includes only a sampling of the literally hundreds of cases dealing with
homosexual parents and child custody, with research restricted to those (mostly) recent cases
dealing with the issue of gay or lesbian couples. For more cases, see Rivera, supra note 24, at
883-904; Annotation, Visitation Rights of Homosexual or Lesbian Parent, 36 A.L.R. 4TH 997
(1985); Annotation, Initial Award or Denial of Child Custody to Homosexual or Lesbian Par-
ent, 6 A.L.R. 4TH 1297 (1981); Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations with Third
Persons as Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R. 3D 625 (1980).
495. See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
496. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217-18 & n.10 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[W]hen individual married couples are isolated from observation by others, the way in which
they voluntarily choose to conduct their intimate relations is a matter for them-not the
State-to decide.").
497. Missouri and Virginia have facially neutral sodomy statutes, and New Jersey has, since
the decision in In re JS. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974), decriminalized con-
sensual sodomy.
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In J.L.P. (H.) v. D.J.P.498 a Missouri court restricted a politically ac-
tive gay father's visitation rights by invoking the state's sexual miscon-
duct statute,4 99 suggesting that the father might "induce" similar
behavior (i.e. sodomy) in the son."° And in Roe v. Roe,50 1 the Virginia
Supreme Court pointed out with candor and clarity that Virginia's sod-
omy statute is frequently used to prosecute "conduct inherent in the
[gay] father's relationship"5" 2 while the heterosexual offense of adultery
is seldom prosecuted." 3
Virginia and Missouri had facially neutral sodomy statutes which
the cases suggest are only discriminatory as applied. This is particularly
true in the Missouri case, where the father was politically active in at-
tempting to change the law."° Absent the shield of marital privacy dis-
cussed by Justice Stevens in Bowers v. Hardwick 50s child custody can be
used as leverage to deter gay or lesbian parents' political conduct in this
area. Since the sodomy laws are not used against unmarried heterosexual
partners, heterosexuals seldom feel the need to reform those laws that
their gay and lesbian counterparts do.
This is true a fortiori in the seven states which have sodomy laws
that apply only to homosexual relationships, 506 illustrated in the Arkan-
sas case of Thigpen v. Carpenter.50 7 In Thigpen a woman and her lesbian
life partner were denied joint custody of the former wife's children.5 0 8 In
his concurring opinion, Judge Cracraft attacked the mother for her
"fixed determination to continue that course of illegal conduct for the
rest of her life, in a home in which the children also reside," daring her to
498. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App. 1982).
499. Id. at 869 (citing Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 566.090.1(3)).
500. Id. This notion of the origins of sexual orientation was apparently shared by the father
himself. See id. (father's testimony that he thought it would be "desirable" for his son to
"become" homosexual).
501. 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
502. Id. at 727-28, 324 S.E.2d at 694. Note the Virginia sodomy statute is facially neutral
but has apparently not been used to deny custody to heterosexual parents in the reported cases.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (1988).
503. Roe, 228 Va. at 728, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
504. J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. at 494, 324 A.2d at 95. In J.L.P.(H.), the court noted that
the father was "oriented toward the 'cause' of homosexuality." J.L.P. (H.), 643 S.W.2d at 869.
This suggests the court viewed homosexuality not so much as a sexual orientation as a kind of
political orientation. This in turn suggests the court understood the issue as one of politics
rather than intimate relationships.
505. 478 U.S. 196, 217-18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 491 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (right to marital privacy protected by
ninth amendment).
506. Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada and Texas. See supra note 241.
507. 21 Ark. App. 194, 730 S.W.2d 510 (1987).
508. Id. at 196, 730 S.W.2d at 514.
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"justify her conduct to the children if and when they find her out. 50 9
Judge Cracraft's concurrence went well beyond even the Hardwick
majority's opinion regarding sodomy.5 10 He chastised the appellant for
her "preference for homosexual sodomy." '11 The phrase is telling; it de-
nies that homosexuality has a status distinct from conduct. If someone
merely "prefers" something, she can certainly "prefer" something else. 2
Yet since the Arkansas statute only applies to homosexual sodomy,5 13 it
is not conduct alone that is at issue, but the status of homosexuality. A
sexual "preference" for sodomy would be irrelevant for a heterosexual in
Arkansas.
The majority in Thigpen initially appeared to assume that the
mother had sex in the presence of her child.51 4 Thus, the court was able
to reject the wife's argument that the husband had failed to provide evi-
dence that the wife's sexual orientation would adversely affect the best
interests of the children. 15 All the husband had to show the court was
that the wife engaged in lesbian conduct.51 6 But more than just sexual
conduct is at issue here. The court ultimately admitted the women had
never had sex in front of the child5" 7 but stated that the women had not
taken precautions "to shield the children from exposure to their sexual
activities.151 8 But if the women do not have sex in front of the child,
from what other sexual activities should they protect the child? What
was being argued, whether the court understood it or not, was the polit-
ical implications of homosexuality. It is here that courts which wish to
do so extend their antipathy toward private acts of sodomy into the pub-
lic realm.
509. Id. at 200, 730 S.W.2d at 514 (Cracraft, J., concurring).
510. Judge Cracraft believes Hardwick stands for the proposition that state sodomy statutes
violate "no constitutional guarantees," id. (Cracraft, J., concurring), despite the Hardwick plu-
rality's explicit statement that Hardwick had not defended the lower court judgment on eighth
or ninth amendment grounds, or more importantly, on the basis of the Equal Protection
Clause. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8; see also id. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring)
("[r]espondent has not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below.... [T]his constitutional
argument is not before us.").
511. Thigpen, 21 Ark. App. at 200, 730 S.W.2d at 514 (Cracraft, J., concurring).
512. Though even this thesis is open to question; if a person "preferred," for example, prime
rib over liver, would his preference be any different if he were required by law to eat liver, or
would it only be his conduct which was different, assuming he complied with the law?
513. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1813 (1977).
514. 21 Ark. App. at 197, 730 S.W.2d at 512 ("Arkansas courts have never condoned a
parent's promiscuous conduct or lifestyle when such conduct has been in the presence of the
children.").
515. Id. at 198, 730 S.W.2d at 512-13.
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Thigpen demonstrates that courts are worried about much more
than the private acts of sodomy involved in a sexual relationship. The
issue in child custody cases is, of course, the best interests of the chil-
dren.519 Homosexuality of the parents is itself not a per se harm to chil-
dren on which denial of custody can be based.5 20 Some harm to the
child's best interests must be demonstrated.52' It is the discussion of this
harm that provides insight into how courts misunderstand
homosexuality. 22
In a case from New Jersey, In re J. S. & C.,523 the court was never
able precisely to locate the harm the father's political activity would
cause to the children, but its discussion of the issue is illuminating. The
court discussed drawings by the children in which figures carry signs
saying "Gay is proud" and "We want equal rights," 524 and noted that
such thoughts "would not occur to children of this age without prodding
and indoctrination by an adult. '5 2  The harm the court saw becomes
clearer when, in the next paragraph, the court stated that neither child
appeared to be disturbed by the father's activities.5 26 The necessary im-
plication is that the children should have been disturbed-as disturbed as
the court was. The court initially rejected the theory that exposure of the
children to the "gay movement" would "alter" the children's sexual ori-
entation.527 What the court seemed to be worried about here, then, was
that this exposure had taught them sympathy for the rights of gay men
and lesbians. Apparently, this sympathy was the harm that the father's
political activity caused the children.
The court cited, with apparent approval, testimony that the father's
519. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 2d 325, 330, 669 P.2d 886, 889
(Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (1983) (en bane) ("[Tihe best interests
of the child must be the paramount concern of the court.").
520. See, eg., J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. at 492, 324 A.2d at 94.
521. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601 (West 1983) (unless it can be shown that parental
visitation would be detrimental to child's best interests, reasonable visitation must be awarded
to parents).
522. In J.S & C., for example, the New Jersey court examined the father's "involvement
with and dedication to furthering homosexuality," and mentioned "periodicals with a homo-
sexual orientation." 129 N.J. Super at 494, 324 A.2d at 95.
523. 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d 90 (1974).
524. Id. at 495, 324 A.2d at 95-96.
525. Id., 324 A.2d at 96. The two children were eleven and eight years old. Id. The court's
statement raises the question of whether any thoughts occur to children that are not, at some
level, instigated by adults.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 496, 324 A.2d at 96. It is certain the court assumes this means "alter" from
assumed heterosexuality to homosexuality. A child who was already homosexual could not be
so altered.
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political involvement "had become an obsessive preoccupation,"52 and
that it had gone "beyond the bedroom," '29 "way above and beyond the
actual homosexual involvement."53 This suggests that the tolerable
level of "homosexual involvement" was thus confined to the bedroom;
when homosexual parents, for example, bring their children to political
events to demonstrate that stereotypes of homosexual people are not al-
ways accurate, or even when the parents attend such events by them-
selves, they are acting beyond the limited sphere in which homosexuality
can be accepted, i.e. the bedroom.
The court eventually granted the father visitation, with four restric-
tions. 531 Two are public in nature: during visitation, the father may not
take the children to a gay meeting hall or involve them in "any homosex-
ual related activities or publicity. ' 532 The other two restrictions are
strictly related to the father's private life: during visits by the children he
may not "be in the presence of his lover" or "cohabit or sleep with any
individual other than a lawful spouse. ' 533 This is a large step toward
breaking down any conceptual barrier between public and private. The
father's relationship with his lover is now part of the "homosexually ori-
ented milieu in which defendant has submerged himself, ' 534 and which
also, presumably, includes the acceptable level of homosexual "involve-
ment" in the bedroom. Thus, the court suggests homosexual involve-
ment will be tolerated as long as it is confined to the bedroom, but not if
there is another homosexual person there.
More important, the father may not apparently even live with his
lover, or any adult except a "lawful spouse. '5 35 The requirement has a
clear punitive effect. The father may not validate his choice of a partner
in accordance with his sexual orientation by doing what nearly all
couples do to fulfill the potential of their life relationships, move in to-
gether. The court effectively required the father to present a fictitious
private life to his children. It is highly unrealistic to think that such a
fiction can be maintained for very long. As one court in New Jersey has




531. Id. at 498, 324 A.2d at 97.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id., 324 A.2d at 96.
535. Id., 324 A.2d at 97. An alternate construction, that they may "cohabit" together when
the children are not visiting, but cease cohabition when the children arrive, implies that it is
possible to live together and not live together.
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children may deem that life is different than it is."
5 36
Eight years after JS. & C., a Missouri court of appeals decided L. v.
D. 5 37 in which a lesbian sought to change the custody of her two younger
children, who had been awarded to their father.5 38 The court affirmed
the lower court's judgment which not only denied the motion, but placed
limitations on the children's visits to their mother similar to those in J.S.
& C, specifying that "any contact between K.C. [the mother's partner]
or any other lesbian lover of the appellant and the children would, in
fact, impair their emotional development., 53 9 The court seemed to have
two worries: that the environment was "unwholesome"'"' and that it
would lead toward the children either becoming homosexual 541 or at
least suffering "social ostracism, contempt and unhappiness."' 42 These
problems resulted from the mother's lesbian "life-style. 51 4 3 In dismissing
the mother's expert witnesses, the court found that "[the] evidence of the
realities of appellant's life-style demonstrates that the testimony of her
expert witnesses dealt with abstractions." 5"
The only evidence of this "life-style" cited by the court was that the
couple had a poster of two naked women, and "naked females were por-
trayed on the shower curtain and the toilet seat cover. '545 Even assum-
ing that no heterosexual men have representations of nude women in
their homes while their children are growing up, how do such decora-
tions constitute the whole of a person's lifestyle? More seems to be at
work here than judicial disapproval of a parent's taste in home decor.
The critical phrase in the court's language is that the expert witnesses
were dealing with "abstractions. ' 546 The experts had addressed and re-
jected the claim that these children would be harmed by living with their
mother and her lover.5 47  This is far from an abstraction in the case; it
dislocates the homosexual pareft's real life into the world of ideas. What
536. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 436, 404 A.2d 1256, 1262 (1979).
537. 630 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. App. 1982).
538. Id. at 241.
539. Id. at 245.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. The court, giving the linguistics of sexual orientation a new twist, stated that
homosexuality is a "sexual disorientation." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, to the court, the issue
was not that all people have an orientation-some to members of the same gender, most to
members of the opposite gender-but rather that heterosexuals have a sexual orientation, and
gay men and lesbians, having lost sight of their sexual compass, have become disoriented.




547. Id. at 243.
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could possibly be less abstract in a case of child custody than testimony
about potential harm to the children? The court reinforced the notion
that it was unable to grasp the real lives of the people involved when it
noted that it was aware of "no authority . . . that does not view the
homosexual with bewildered compassion." 4 '
This willingness to discredit testimony that custody by homosexual
parents is not harmful is hardly uncommon. In JL.P. (H.) v. D.JP.,
another court of appeals in Missouri dismissed "uncontradicted evi-
dence" by psychologists that no per se harm would come to the children
by virtue of living with a homosexual parent,55° that a child's sexual ori-
entation is set by age four or five, 551 and that the fear of child molestation
by homosexual persons is rare, if not quite nonexistent.
5 52
The court cited to other appellate opinions in which gay men mo-
lested male minors." 3 Molestation was a heavy focus of the opinion,
despite the fact that the mother made no accusation that the father had
molested the child.554  The court based its opinion on the problem of
male molestation of minor boys by citing to seven cases in which this was
an issue,555 but cites no comparable cases dealing with heterosexual mo-
lestations, nor any evidence of the number of homosexual people who do
not molest minors. This would be necessary in order to ascertain statisti-
cal accuracy, since the issue is not a charge that this father has molested
his son, but that homosexual people, as a class, are likely to molest chil-
dren. Yet, based on this evidence, the court concluded that "given the
statistical incidence of homosexuality .. .homosexual molestation is
probably, on an absolute basis, more prevelant [than heterosexual moles-
tation]. '556 Thus, "the father's acknowledgement that he is living with
an avowed homosexual certainly augurs for potential harm to the
child. ' 557 Far from being neutral about potential strengths that a stable
homosexual home environment could have, the JL.P. (H) court assumed
such a home would be harmful because of the likelihood that the child
would be molested.
Molestation is a clear and obvious harm, assuming it can be proved.
548. Id. (citation omitted).
549. 643 S.W.2d 865 (Mo. App. 1982).
550. Id. at 867.
551. Id. at 866-67.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 869.
554. Id. at 867. The most serious charge the mother seems to have made is that the child's
"bedwetting" had become more serious. Id.
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The harm caused by a child's learning tolerance or compassion is much
less difficult to state, and is therefore seldom obvious in court opinions.
But in In re Marriage of Cabalquinto,5 58 the trial court was quite candid
about this issue. While the Washington Supreme Court held that the
case should be remanded for further proceedings to determine if the
lower court had decided the case on the improper basis of the father's
homosexuality alone,559 four justices had no doubts that the trial court
had, indeed, impermissibly found against allowing the father to have the
children visit him in his own home with his life partner.5" The dissent-
ers found that "the trial judge clearly allowed his personal feelings to
dictate the result."56 They arrived at this conclusion by reviewing the
transcript of the trial judge's oral opinion, in which that judge had said:
Well, in my view a child should be led in the way of heterosex-
ual preference, not be tolerant of this thing. God Almighty
made the two sexes not only to enjoy, but to perpetuate the
human race ....
I certainly can't find that the boy's best interest would be
served by being subjected to this tolerant attitude ....s62
Cabalquinto involved no claims of political activity by the father or
his partner. The source of the harm would be the child's visits to the
father's home in California.163 The relational issue here is crucial. It is
utterly conventional for couples who love one another, and particularly
those willing to share their lives together, that they live in the same
home. But rulings like the one by the trial judge in Cabalquinto view
even that home environment as being infected by the sexual aspects of
the relationship. It places a penalty on homosexual parents who do form
lasting relationships, preferring single gay men and lesbians to partnered
ones. This is precisely the opposite of the way we tend to view heterosex-
ual parenting after divorce, where opposite sex couples are encouraged to
remarry so their home will be more desirable in custody arrangements.
The sexual infection of the gay and lesbian home was also the issue
in Roe v. Roe 5 in which a gay father with joint custody who had been
558. 100 Wash. 2d 325, 669 P.2d 886 (1983) (en banc).
559. Id. at 329, 669 P.2d at 888.
560. Id. at 334, 669 P.2d at 889 (Stafford, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
561. Id. at 331, 669 P.2d at 889 (Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
562. Id. at 332, 669 P.2d at 890 (Stafford, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
563. Id. at 326, 669 P.2d at 887. The father had previously had to travel to the mother's
home in Washington for his visitation. Id.
564. 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
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single began a domestic relationship with another man,565 and by virtue
of the relationship was found to be unfit for continued joint custody.1
66
There was no allegation that the daughter had been exposed to any sex-
ual activities of the couple. The couple testified that they did not
"flaunt" their relationship. 67 Nevertheless, the trial court found that
"this relationship, of sharing the same bed or bedroom with the child
being in the home would be one of the greatest degrees of flaunting that
one could imagine."5 6
This redefines "flaunt," which ordinarily contains an implication of
ostentation, 569 and points up the degree to which marriage protects a
sexual relationship. Nearly all married couples share "the same bed or
bedroom" in the same home with children, and yet there is no thought of
this being the "flaunting" of a sexual relationship, much less "one of the
greatest degrees of flaunting that one could imagine." According to this
definition, a homosexual couple could flaunt their relationship by inviting
friends over for dinner.
But the court went even further into the couple's ordinary life to
discover this sexual infection in their home. While sharing the same bed-
room would also be grounds for restrictive custody in Virginia if the
couple were unmarried and heterosexual,57 the court took offense at the
spectre of "males hugging and patting each other on the behind.
571
This is hardly offensive conduct when performed by heterosexual
couples, even if unmarried, and, as the court points out, is also com-
monly engaged in by football players.517  But the court considered how
the daughter would explain this conduct when she began dating or
wanted to have a slumber party.5 73 This at least suggests a world in
which her daughter's friends will be hostile toward homosexual people.
While that might be true, there is another possibility: that the men's
relationship might need no explanation, that the daughter's friends
might, by this time, have spent time in the home and been fully aware of
565. Id. at 725, 324 S.E.2d at 692. Up to that time he had been "a fit, devoted and compe-
tent custodian." Id.
566. Id. at 723-24, 324 S.E.2d at 691.
567. Id. at 725, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
568. Id.
569. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 867 (1976) ("To wave or flut-
ter showily; to display or obtrude oneself to public notice, esp. by reason of excessive or gaudy
finery or impropriety of behavior").
570. See Roe, 228 Va. at 726, 324 S.E.2d at 693 (citing Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 237
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the relationship between her father and his partner, or might be ac-
cepting of homosexual relationships by virtue of some other exposure. 74
Similarly, in S.E.G. v. R.A. G.575 the court raised the concern that
the town is a "small, conservative community... [where h]omosexuality
is not openly accepted or widespread." '576 This is another case where the
tainted homosexual conduct is not sex per se, but ordinary relational
conduct. Not only do the mother and her partner "sleep together in the
same bed," '577 they "show affection toward one another in front of the
children."57 Thus, courts have reached the point at which virtually
every act of affectional conduct between same-sex partners, from sex it-
self, to kissing, hugging, patting, touching, or, apparently, now, even
looking at one another fondly, is a source not only of infection of the
home, but of disqualification of the parent for custody. Despite the
courts' repeated protests that homosexuality per se is not grounds for
removing custody,579 there is virtually no conduct a parent can perform
in a domestic partnership with a long term, same-sex lover, either in the
home or outside it, that is immune from judicial scrutiny as pregnant
with some potential "harm" to the child. Everything that a homosexual
parent does is public, on view, in a way that acts of heterosexual parents
are not.
Thus, for homosexual couples, the arguments made by the courts
cited at the beginning of the section regarding the parents' political activ-
ity have no bounds. 80 The court in J.S. & C. meant far more than it said
when it argued that "homosexual involvement" is improper if it goes
"beyond the bedroom."
581
2. Cases ruling in favor of gay and lesbian couples
Nevertheless, homosexual couples are not uniformly denied child
custody. In S.N.E. v. R.L.B.,582 the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a
574. This attitude is common to nearly all of the decisions in this section. Courts seldom
posit the existence of people in the community who would be tolerant of the gay or lesbian
citizens who already live in the community.
575. 735 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App. 1987).
576. Id. at 166. Note that homosexuality is nowhere "widespread." It is tolerated or not
tolerated, but seems not to exceed certain fairly low statistical bounds in any given population.
See, eg., HUMAN MALE, supra note 36, at 650-51; HUMAN FEMALE, supra note 36, at 488.
577. S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166.
578. Id.
579. See, e.g., In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 492, 324 A.2d 90, 94 (1974); In re
Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. 325, 329, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (1983) (en bane).
580. See supra notes 498-536 and accompanying text.
581. J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. at 496, 324 A.2d at 96.
582. 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
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lower court which had granted a father sole custody on a finding that the
mother was living with her lesbian partner. 83 The father had originally
sought custody on the grounds that the mother held "radical political
views." '584 While the Alaska Supreme Court found there was much on
the record about the mother's homosexuality,585 the court was unable to
discover a nexus between the mere fact of her homosexuality and any
adverse effect on the child.586 The only connection the lower court had
found was that the mother's lesbian relationship "might be less stable
and longlasting" than the father's recent marriage.587 The supreme
court, however, found this to be "conjecture by the [lower] court, since
there was no evidence Mother's relationship was not committed. Instead
the court relied on its own unsupported opinion that homosexual rela-
tionships are unstable and usually of short duration. '5 88
The court hurdled three significant obstacles in this opinion. First,
the court simply ignored the "political views" problem of cases like J.S.
& C. 89 Aside from the father's allegation, the mother's politics were not
referred to again in the opinion.5 9' This may have been because the court
faced head-on the second, and much more important analytical problem,
the nexus between parental conduct and harm to the child.591 The Ar-
kansas court in Thigpen simply dispensed with the nexus requirement if
the parent's conduct was homosexual.5 92 The Alaska court viewed the
nexus issue as the central problem in the case.5 93 The mother's homosex-
uality was a strong focus at the trial.594 Yet, according to the Alaska
court, mere evidence that the mother was a lesbian was not necessarily
evidence that she was unfit for custody. 95 In fact, the record indicated
the opposite to the Alaska court: the child had been raised in the
mother's home for three years, and his development had been
",excellent. ,596
583. Id. at 877.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 878-79.
586. Id. at 876.
587. Id. at 879 n.6.
588. Id.
589. See cases discussed supra notes 495-536.
590. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 877.
591. Id. Contrast this with Thigpen, 21 Ark. App. at 197-98, 730 S.W.2d at 513.
592. Thigpen, 21 Ark. App. at 197-98, 730 S.W.2d at 513. That court seemed to view
homosexuality as synonymous with "illicit." Id.
593. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879.
594. Id. at 878 & n.4.
595. Id. at 879.
596. Id. The court also dispensed with the argument that being raised by a homosexual
parent would influence a child to somehow "become" homosexual. Id.
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The court addressed the theory of indirect harm caused by social
disapproval. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Palmore v. Sidoti5 97 in which the Court held that general community
prejudice against interracial couples was an insufficient justification for
removing custody of a child from the parent involved in an interracial
relationship,198 the Alaska court stated: "Simply put, it is impermissible
to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's status
as a lesbian."59 9 Homosexuality, unlike heterosexuality, can be viewed
by those so inclined, as a per se disqualifying factor-the "harm" is in-
herent in the status because the community disapproves. Here, this was
questioned. The court required an inquiry into some real harm to the
child. '  Absent a "finding that a parent's conduct has or reasonably will
have an adverse impact on the child,"6"1 a court may not conclude the
child of a homosexual parent will be harmed solely on the basis of com-
munity prejudice. By defusing the argument attaching social stigma to
the status of homosexuality via Palmore, the court, in effect, removed the
only available reason for treating homosexuality differently than hetero-
sexuality. The argument reduces to this: social stigma against homosex-
ual people is fundamentally all that separates them from heterosexuals.
Public prejudice is not the fault of a homosexual parent, and therefore,
the court cannot punish the parent (and the child) by calling public prej-
udice "harm."
In doing this, the court addressed the third obstacle many courts
face, the point-of-view problem itself. The court insisted on a neutral
view of the status of sexual orientation, a view which sees sexual orienta-
tion as a difference without significance, requiring that homosexual par-
ents not be treated differently under the law than heterosexual parents.
602
This is the power that the "social stigma" argument carries-heterosexu-
ality has no such stigma, so the purely non-sexual activities of only ho-
mosexual couples, such as affectionate hugging, or more public political
activities designed to change public awareness, can be reached by the
"harm to the child" analysis in a way they cannot be reached for unmar-
ried heterosexual couples. And this is the force Palmore has, for it blocks
such status stigma.60 3
597. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
598. Id. at 433.
599. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 879 n.6.
603. But see S.E.G., 735 S.W.2d at 166 (rejecting Palmore argument because Hardwick de-
nies homosexual citizens all constitutional protection).
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The California Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of Birdsall' has
taken the same position of requiring "an affirmative showing of harm or
likely harm to the child" in order to restrict parental custody, even when
the social stigma comes in its severest form, religious intolerance.6 05 In
Birdsall, the child's mother, a Jehovah's Witness60 6 tried to restrict over-
night visitation of the son with the father because the father shared a
home with two other gay men. 7 The lower court had found that the
father's sexual practices "have hardly been discreet"' 8 solely on the ba-
sis that his membership in the Jehovah's Witnesses was terminated be-
cause of his status as a homosexual. 9 The court of appeal found this
conclusion "meritless" and stated, "[T]here is no evidence, of any indis-
cretion attendant upon the father's acknowledgment of his homosexual-
ity or of his leaving the church. '610 The court saw "[n]o current harm to
the child" attributable to the father's sexual orientation alone,611 nor any
evidence of future detriment" due to that factor.612 The court rejected a
per se rule that a homosexual parent's visitation must be subject to re-
straining orders, and accomplished the same effect as Palmore by pre-
cluding a showing of harm based on generalized bias alone.6 13
Perhaps the most persuasively argued opinion in favor of granting
custody to a homosexual couple is MA.B. v. R.B.614 in which a gay fa-
ther sought sole custody of his twelve-year-old son, and tried to block the
mother's attempt to move to Florida from her home in New York with
the two younger children.615 While the mother had had custody of all
three children since the couple's separation, she had suffered health
problems which resulted in the children being cared for by their father or
grandparents during the mother's periods of hospitalization.616
The older son had discipline problems at school, and at the sugges-
tion of the school psychologist, who was aware of the father's homosexu-
ality, the boy moved into the father's home for five months. 617 The
604. 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1988).
605. Id at 1030, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
606. Id. at 1027, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 1030, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 1031, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
612. Id., 243 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
613. Id. at 1030 n.4, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 290 n.4.
614. 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1986).
615. Id. at 318, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
616. Id., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61.
617. Id. at 319-20, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
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father took a job demotion in order to be more available to the boy and
the school, and the boy's behavior improved, as noted by the school prin-
cipal, the psychologist, the father, and the boy himself.61
The boy then moved in with the mother again, and his behavior
again deteriorated.619 The boy consistently persuaded the mother to let
him terminate his emotional therapy sessions.62 On these facts, the
court awarded custody to the father as being in the boy's best interests.621
The court addressed the mother's concern that the father's homo-
sexuality would have an adverse effect on the boy by looking, not at the
sexual aspect of the father's relationship with his partner, but at the rela-
tionship's domestic character. 622 The court noted the eight-year stability
of the relationship, as well as its exclusivity. 623 While noting that the boy
himself had some difficulty accepting his father's homosexuality, the
court said the boy would eventually be required "to integrate the fact of
his father's homosexuality into his own life."'624 To the social stigma ar-
gument, the court responded, "to accept these problems are inevitable is,
however, a long distance from saying that the father's homosexual con-
duct has had an adverse effect on the boy. ,625
The New York court then cited an opinion from New Jersey, M.P.
. S..o 626 in which a lesbian mother was given custody of her children.627
In rejecting the approach of courts which require a homosexual parent to
present an asexual facade to their children, the New Jersey court had
said:
[T]here is little to gain by creating an artificial world where the
children may deem that life is different than it is .... There is
no reason to think that the girls will be unable to manage
whatever anxieties may flow from the community's disapproval
of their mother .... If defendant retains custody, it may be that
because the community is intolerant of her differences these
girls will sometimes have to bear themselves with greater than
ordinary fortitude. But this does not necessarily portend that
their moral welfare or safety will be jeopardized. It is just as
618. Id. at 320, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
619. Id., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
620. Id.
621. Id at 321, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
622. Id. at 323, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
623. Id
624. Id.
625. Id., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64 (emphasis in original).
626. Id. (citing M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 436-39, 404 A.2d 1256, 1262-63 (1979)).
627. M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 439, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (1979).
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reasonable to expect that they will emerge better equipped to
search out their own standards of right and wrong, better able
to perceive that the majority is not always correct in its moral
judgments, and better able to understand the importance of
conforming their beliefs to the requirements of reason and
tested knowledge, not the constraints of current popular senti-
ment or prejudice.
Taking the children from the defendant can be done only
at the cost of sacrificing those very qualities they will find most
sustaining in meeting the challenges inevitably ahead. Instead
of forebearance and feelings of protectiveness, it will foster in
them a sense of shame for their mother ....
We conclude that the children's best interests will be dis-
served by undermining in this way their growth as mature and
principled adults .... Nothing suggests that [the mother's] ho-
mosexual preference in itself presents any threat of harm to her
daughters or that in the ordinary course of their development
they will be unable to deal with whatever vexation may be
caused to their spirits by the community.628
The New York court reinforced the New Jersey court's reasoning with
the United States Supreme Court's language in Palmore that "[t]he Con-
sititution cannot control ... prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot
directly or indirectly give them effect." '629
By this route courts can, at least minimally, reconstruct some terri-
tory of private life for a homosexual couple. Courts that rule against
homosexual couples import an anti-homosexual bias into the supposed
privacy of the home, by attributing to the child a societal bias. The New
Jersey court in S.P. and the New York court in M.A.B., on the other
hand, assume the child is a participant with his or her parents in the
struggle against a sometimes hostile community. Rather than participat-
ing in the creation of "an artificial world" where a homosexual parent,
unlike a heterosexual parent, is supposed to pretend she does not have a
need to form a meaningful relationship, these courts recognize the homo-
sexual parents' reality, and invest that with moral worth. Far from being
harmed by the prejudice against their parents, children can, in fact, be-
come "better equipped" to deal with the world.63 ° Moreover, rather
628. Id. at 436-39, 404 A.2d at 1262-63.
629. M.A.B., 134 Misc. 2d at 324-25, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
630. M.P., 169 N.J. Super. at 437, 404 A.2d at 1262.
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than merely accepting the biased status quo as inevitable, these courts
give children and their parents a possibility of recognizing bigotry as big-
otry, and perhaps challenging it.63' By recognizing bigotry as bigotry, a
court allows a child to align with her or his homosexual parents, in a way
we quite easily assume children align with their parents if those parents
are heterosexual. This is quite different from the lower court's attitude in
Cabalquinto, in which the judge was certain the child would be harmed
"by being subjected to this tolerant attitude," '632 or J.S. & C., where the
court noted with surprise that the children were not "disturbed" by their
father's political activities.633 In each of those cases the judge treated the
child as if the child necessarily shared, or should share, the judge's view
of the parent.
E. Health Care
The single case discussed here, In re Guardianship of Kowalski 634 is,
in a significant way, different from all the other cases discussed in this
Part. In this case, Sharon Kowalski, who had been living with her lover,
Karen Thompson, was injured in a 1983 auto accident.635 The accident
left Kowalski physically and mentally impaired and with only a limited
ability to communicate.636 Thompson fought for six years for the right
to be Kowalski's guardian.637 Unlike any other case in this Comment,
Thompson was not asking the courts for any conventionally defined ben-
efit. Her ultimate victory won her no tort recovery, no employment ben-
631. The New York court in MA.B. also quoted with approval this language from the New
Jersey court:
Instead of courage and the precept that people of integrity do not shrink from bigots
... [a denial of custody would counsel] the easy option of shirking difficult problems
and following the course of expedience .... It diminishes [the children's] regard for
the rule of human behavior, everywhere accepted, that we do not forsake those to
whom we are indebted for love and nurture merely because they are held in low
esteem by others.
MA.B., 134 Misc. 2d at 324, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 964 (quoting M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425,
437, 404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (1979)).
632. Cabalquinto, 100 Wash. at 332, 669 P.2d at 890 (Stafford, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
633. JS. & C., 129 N.J. Super. at 495, 324 A.2d at 96.
634. 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. App. 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1467 (1986).
635. Id. at 862-63.
636. Id at 863.
637. See Cuniberti, nhose Life Is It?, L.A. Times, Aug. 5, 1988, pt. V at 1, col. 1 (Thomp-
son "has been in and out of Minnesota courts more than 20 times" trying to gain the same
rights a married partner would have for guardianship of her injured spouse); K. THOMPSON &
J. ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? 193-217 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter K. THOMPSON]. Thompson ultimately won, and is now allowed to visit her partner as well
as to provide for her care. FRONTIERS NEWSMAG., Dec. 29, 1989, at 33.
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efits, no child custody, no lease succession. What Thompson asked the
court for was her right to share the burden of care implicit in her rela-
tionship with Kowalski, the right to care for her disabled partner and
nothing more. This is, in essence, the "right" to fulfill the obligations, so
important in the cases discussed above,63 that she felt toward her part-
ner. To this end she went to court more than twenty times639 and ex-
pended over $125,000 in legal fees.' In many ways this case is the
quintessential battle over the definition of family in the context of same-
sex relationships.6 1
On March 2, 1984, after Sharon Kowalski was disabled by the auto
accident, Thompson petitioned to become Kowalski's guardian. 2
Sharon Kowalski's father, Donald Kowalski, cross-petitioned.643 While
recognizing that Thompson and the parents "each have a significant rela-
tionship" with Sharon, and that each was "suitable and qualified" for
guardianship, 6 " the trial court awarded the father guardianship, giving
no reason for its choice of him over Thompson, but explicitly stating that
the choice was not "a recognition that he is the most suitable or best
qualified among those available and willing to discharge the trust." 6 5
The court dismissed the idea of joint guardianship "in light of the diffi-
638. E.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988); Bras-
chi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1988). See supra notes
400-10 and 419-23 and accompanying text.
639. See Cuniberti, supra note 637.
640. Id.
641. It may be useful to compare this case to a recent case with similar facts in the context
of a heterosexual marriage, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (No. 88-1503 1989). In that case, Nancy Cruzan went into a persis-
tent vegetative state after an auto accident. Id. at 410. Her husband saw to her care for a
short time, and then filed for, and was granted, a divorce. Id. at 431 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
This left his ex-wife's parents to care for their daughter.
While the husband's action in Cruzan may not be typical of marriages in general-indeed,
it is probably atypical-his action illuminates two things pertinent to the discussion of Kowal-
ski: first, the pressures involved in these cases are considerable. But more important, it is not -
the marital relationship which is at issue, but the duty which arises in the uninjured party to
care for the injured person. While that duty was not felt strongly enough by the husband in
Cruzan (and was mentioned only in the dissent, and then, only in passing), it was and is felt
keenly by Thompson in Kowalski, and not only felt, but acted upon despite the lack of a formal
sanction to the relationship by the state, a church, or anyone else. In this sense, Thompson's
relationship to Kowalski was more akin to the family relationship of her lover's blood relatives
than to the formalized and dissolved relationship Cruzan's husband had with his wife. The
important factor is, as the California Supreme Court suggested in Elden, the obligations the
parties have to one another. Elden, 46 Cal.3d at 275, 758 P.2d at 586, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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culties" that existed between the parents and Thompson. 1 6 Neverthe-
less, both parties were given equal access to Sharon's medical and
financial records and equal visitation rights.' 47
Over the next several months, Sharon was moved numerous
times."4s This was followed by a series of restraining orders against both
Thompson and the father, ending with both parties petitioning for a
change in the guardianship order.' 49 The court reviewed medical evi-
dence suggesting Sharon became depressed after Thompson's visits and
concluded that this was sufficient evidence of harm to award guardian-
ship to the father without restrictions. 650 Donald Kowalski immediately
terminated Thompson's visitation rights. 1
The court of appeals began its analysis of these facts by referring to
the "alleged" relationship of Sharon and Thompson.6 2 As was the case
in Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration,53 the case was all
but decided before the end of the first paragraph of analysis. The court
referred to Thompson as Sharon's "friend"6 4 and "roommate."6 55 De-
spite the fact that these "friends" had "exchanged rings," and named one
another as beneficiaries in their life insurance policies, the court de-
scribed the women's relationship as "uncertain" because Sharon Kowal-
ski had allegedly closed their joint bank account and, based solely on the
testimony of Sharon's sister, that Sharon was "considering" moving to
Colorado at some time prior to the accident. 656 The court said Thomp-
son "claims" this was a lesbian relationship.65 7
It is difficult to see how it could have been anything else. Heterosex-
ual "friends" of the same sex who are living together seldom, if ever,
exchange rings and name one another as beneficiaries in life insurance








653. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985). See supra notes 468-71 and accom-
panying text.
654. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863.
655. Id.
656. Id. Thompson stated after the decision that she, not Kowalski, had closed the ac-
count, a fact not brought up at the trial. K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 181. Sharon's
sister, like the rest of the Kowalski family, exhibited clear hostility to the relationship between
Sharon and Karen. See Cuniberti, supra note 637.
657. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863.
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that Kowalski never told her family of the relationship.65 How this
would prove the uncertainty of the relationship is a mystery: given sub-
sequent events, any fear the women may have had that the parents would
react to this news with firmly-held prejudice and rejection was fully justi-
fied. There was clear evidence of the father's difficulty with his daugh-
ter's relationship-Donald Kowalski testified at the trial that he did not
believe his daughter loved Thompson, without stating any reason for his
belief. 59 While it is not unusual for a court to believe one version of the
facts over another, the court apparently failed to consider at any level the
interests of the parties making their claims. Thompson's interest was to
be certain Sharon was receiving the best care possible,66 ° and to be
granted access to the person she loved most in the world.661 While it is
certain the parents also had a strong interest in their daughter's care,
they also exhibited an interest in maintaining a fiction about their daugh-
ter's sexual orientation. The result of this second interest is to deny
Thompson's place in Sharon's life as either partner, caregiver or lover.662
This suggests that homophobia was a significant issue in the case.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals referred repeatedly to the
difficult relationship between the parties,663 but neither court ever ex-
amined what the source of the difficulties was. This viewed homophobia
as unproblematic in exactly the way Minow describes,6 4 and ignored the
very battle that Thompson was waging. Even if the trial court had been
correct in granting Donald Kowalski unrestricted guardianship, the
proper analysis would have had to include a determination that Sharon
was being harmed by visits from her chosen partner, not merely her
"friend" or "roommate. ' 665 And it is the fear of homosexuality which
perceieves a lifetime commitment as if it were only an ordinary
friendship.
The court gave weight to the "unconditional parental love 666 Ko-
walski had for his daughter, and, in dismissing Thompson's relationship,
stated that she "fails to acknowledge the strong confidential relationship
which exists between parent and child. ' 667 The power of the parent-
658. Id.
659. K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 134 (quoting testimony at trial).
660. Id. at 28.
661. Id. at 37.
662. Id.
663. Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d at 863, 867.
664. Minow, supra note 196, at 53.
665. Id. at 863.
666. Id. at 865.
667. Id.
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child bond is beyond question. But whatever else a parent-child relation-
ship is, it is not voluntary, at least not as viewed by the child. As be-
tween adult family relationships rooted in blood and adult family
relationships based on commitments, the voluntary and mutual choices
made in the latter would seem to indicate that they should be given pref-
erence in a legal context where the wishes of the party are at issue.6 68
And that was exactly the problem in this case. The guardian is ex-
pected to carry out "any reliably expressed wishes of the ward" and de-
termine what will be in the ward's "best interest. ' 669 Because the court
was apparently unable even to address the women's voluntary relation-
ship as the women viewed it, it appeared that the only "family" Sharon
had was her parents. The court was apparently not willing to view
Thompson as a member of Sharon's family. 70 When looking at the evi-
dence of the ward's best interests, the court gave overriding weight to the
fact that Sharon "regularly experiences depression and moodiness fol-
lowing Thompson's visits."67 The court did not discuss the possibility
that this may have been because Sharon missed Thompson when she was
gone. That was borne out by the testimony of two doctors at trial. 2
The court also did not consider the far more important problem of
granting the father the power to terminate Thompson's visits entirely.
The evidence of Sharon's wishes may have been contradictory. 3 Yet
there was no evidence that she did not want Karen to visit, and abundant
evidence that it is important for the concerned loved ones to spend time
with an injured person. 7 The lower court's order produced a result that
cut off that benefit.675 Like the courts in the child custody cases dis-
668. See id. at 867.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 865 (quoting In re Guardianship of Schober, 303 Minn. 226, 230, 226 N.W.2d
895, 898 (1975) (those with "family ties" to ward are generally selected as guardians, but
others may also serve as guardians)).
671. Id. at 866.
672. K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 130, 136 (testimony of Drs. Cowan and Gregor).
673. See Cuniberti, supra note 637 (questioning of Sharon):
Q. Do you want to live with your father?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you want to live with your mother?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you want to live with Karen?
A. Yes.
See also K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 152-53 (tests of Sharon indicate she was fully aware
of her relationship with Thompson as lesbians who loved one another); id. at 111-15 (same).
674. K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 137 (testimony of Dr. Gregor that "I can't imagine
any circumstances why anyone would want to exclude any person wanting to continue to be
involved with a brain-injured person"); id. at 138.
675. Karen Thompson never planned to similarly exclude the parents, despite their hostil-
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cussed above,6 76 the Kowalski court apparently assessed the harm in the
case by positing a world in which homosexuality itself constitutes
harm.
677
The decision is not merely the result of a homophobic bias. The
opinion, in fact, has both sexist overtones and suggests paternalistic ste-
reotypes about the disabled. Thus women's groups and the disabled
joined the gay community in protesting the decision. 67 ' This is what Mi-
now points out when she makes her plea for "deliberate attention to our
own partiality., 679 If we are aware of our biases, whatever they are, "we
can begin to acknowledge the dangers of pretended impartiality. By tak-
ing difference into account, we can overcome our pretended indifference
to difference, and people our worlds with those who can surprise and
enrich one another.
680
In this case particularly, but in many of the cases discussed in this
Part, if the court had acknowledged the often obvious point that the ho-
mosexual parties have experienced bias because of their sexual orienta-
tion, it could have overcome its own "indifference to difference." It is
just this indifference that the Kowalski court demonstrates when it ig-
nores the very tangible problem of the Kowalskis' fear of homosexuality.
But for that fear, the parents could have seen not only the commitment
their daughter had made to Thompson, but acknowledged thit Thomp-
son's commitment to their daughter's well-being is extraordinary by any
standards. That is the commitment that defines, or ought to define, the
boundary of family.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
It should be apparent that while a central problem in understanding
the relationships of same-sex couples is, and will continue to be, the prob-
lem of perspective, the underlying problem is the assumptions we make
about the meaning of words like "family." Because the realm of volun-
tary adult relationships is still all but preempted by marriage, and be-
ity, and throughout intended to work together with them for Sharon's recovery. See id. at 23-
25, and 103-04. One of Karen's initial letters to the Kowalskis stated, "I have never and would
never want to keep you from Sharon." Id. at 37.
676. See supra notes 498-581 and accompanying text.
677. Here, unlike the "harm" asserted to children in custody disputes, the harm to Sharon
is not to the formation of a homosexual person out of a pre-sexual child, but the recognition of
a homosexual relationship the parents clearly wish had never occurred, and continue to deny
ever existed. See, eg., Cuniberti, supra note 637 (Donald Kowalski "does not think his daugh-
ter was or is a lesbian").
678. Cuniberti, supra note 637; see also K. THOMPSON, supra note 637, at 209-17.
679. Minow, supra note 196, at 95.
680. Id.
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cause marriage, itself, still supposes only heterosexual preoccupations,
gay and lesbian couples find themselves in a linguistic void.
Implicated in this is the problem of proof. Courts have repeatedly
stressed the fact that they cannot be sure the same-sex relationships
before them are as the parties claim them to be.681 Because gay and les-
bian couples are prohibited from forming legally cognizable family rela-
tionships in any of the usual ways, 682 courts are able to use an evidentiary
argument to devitalize homosexual relationships. Thus, couples do not
"claim" to be married-they are or they are not, and can prove it. Gay
and lesbian relationships, however stable and committed, though, are al-
ways open to being merely "claimed" relationships.
68 3
There are three potential solutions to these problems. The first is
legalizing same-sex marriage. The second is the recognition of de facto
family relationships. The third and, perhaps, most practical, is the intro-
duction of both the concept and the term, "domestic partnership."
A. Same-Sex Marriage
Same-sex marriage is without question the most comprehensive and
satisfactory answer to the problems facing gay and lesbian couples. It
has been argued for in the legal literature,684 at mass public demonstra-
tions in the nation's capital,685 and by churches.68 6 Legislative failure to
address the issue has been mentioned by the courts themselves.
68 7
681. See, eg., Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 276, 758 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254,
259 (1988); Hinman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 528, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 410, 417 (1985); In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. App. 1986).
682. Marriage-see, eg. Friedman, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134, 137-44 (1987-88); or adoption-see In re Adoption of
Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 471 N.E.2d 424, 481 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1984).
683. Note that this is not the case with unmarried heterosexual couples. In two California
cases dealing with unmarried heterosexual couples, Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 663 P.2d 904, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1983), and MacGregor v. Unemployment
Ins. Appeals Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 205, 689 P.2d 453, 207 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1984), the court never
referred to the relationships as "claimed" or "alleged," nor did it assume that the couples were
"friends" or "roommates." In both cases, the couples' claim to having a relationship was
unquestioned.
684. Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508,
1605-11, 1628 (1989); Friedman, supra note 684; Comment, The Homosexual's Right to Marry
A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 193 (1979); Note, The
Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
685. Wheeler, 2,000 Gay Couples Exchange Vows in Ceremony of Rights, Wash. Post, Oct.
11, 1987, at B1, col. 2.
686. Dart, Support Grows Among Clergy for 'Weddings' of Gay Couples, L.A. Times, Dec. 7,
1987, pt. 1, at 3, col. 1; Unitarians Endorse Homosexual Marriages, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1984,
A26, col. 4.
687. Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 531, 213 Cal.
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Nevertheless, the antipathy to the idea of same-sex marriage is a
powerful reality in our time.688 Much of this antipathy may arise from
our (mostly) unacknowledged sexist assumptions about the power rela-
tionships inherent in opposite-sex marriage.689 The sexual inequality of
the marriage myth runs deep, and is not touched without arousing dor-
mant passions we seldom have occasion to examine.6 90 Same-sex mar-
riage is the very model of a relationship based on sexual equality, and
challenges marriage as an institution which requires sex-linked difference
for some unexamined reasons other than biology.
However, legal arguments are available.6 91 Predominant among
these is equal protection. 692 State laws which restrict marriage to mem-
bers of the opposite sex discriminate on their face against homosexual
citizens, as well as against bisexual people who wish to commit to and
formalize a same-sex relationship. A state, however, may not "foist or-
thodoxy on the unwilling. '693 If homosexuality is declared a "suspect"
classification, a state would have to offer a compelling reason for discrim-
inating against gay men and lesbians. 694 Even absent a "suspect" classifi-
cation for homosexual citizens the state would have to have at a
minimum a rational basis for discriminating.695 It has been suggested
that such a rational basis must "transcend[] the harm to the members of
the disadvantaged class."' 69 6 Because the harm suffered by lesbians and
gay men under discriminatory marriage laws is so pervasive-most par-
ticularly in the area of privacy-states would have to be careful in justify-
ing them.
Rptr. 410, 419 (1985); Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 1279, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 879
(1987) (Barry-Deal, J., concurring).
688. See Friedman, supra note 6, at 137-44.
689. CrrY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, supp. pt. I at S-206-07:
The perceived danger posed by homosexual relationships is that they present an op-
posing and threatening metaphor of equality, mutuality and respect that, if adopted
as a model for heterosexual relationships, would seriously endanger male preroga-
tives of freedom, excess and authority which men have been taught to expect and
hold dear.
Id.
690. When she raised the issue of same-sex marriage in a recent column, Ann Landers
received 55,000 letters on the subject. Landers, Gay Marriage Draws Mail, L.A. Times, Nov.
27, 1989, at E9, col. 5.
691. See Developments in the Law, supra note 686, at 1603-23.
692. See generally Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 711-31 (9th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) (Norris, J., concurring); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homo-
sexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
693. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 601-02 (1987).
694. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 728 (Norris, J., concurring).
695. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
696. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (emphasis added).
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Under standard equal protection analysis, each of the two potential
classes of homosexual couples not allowed to marry has a direct, simi-
larly situated counterpart among heterosexual couples who are allowed
to marry. The first class, homosexual couples without children, is identi-
cal but for the gender of the partners, to heterosexual couples who
choose not to have children, or who are aware of a biological inability to
have children prior to contracting marriage. To each group, heterosex-
ual or homosexual, the desired family relationship is the voluntary adult
couple. Similarly, homosexual couples who desire to have children, but
cannot biologically produce them are identically situated to infertile het-
erosexual couples who desire to have children but biologically cannot.
The marriage license which gives the heterosexual couple a preferred sta-
tus in adoption proceedings697 is denied to the homosexual couple solely
on the basis of the gay or lesbian couple's lack of gender-difference.698
The differences based on sexual orientation reduce even further
when reproductive technologies are considered. The lack of procreative
potential used as an argument against gay and lesbian couples loses force
when lesbian couples may become artificially inseminated, or gay male
couples may engage a surrogate mother. Thus, drawing a distinction be-
tween heterosexual and homosexual couples based on gender difference,
on the argument that gender difference implies procreative potential, yet
failing to similarly distinguish non-procreative heterosexual couples from
procreative heterosexual couples for the same reason is clearly
underinclusive.699
The second group of homosexual couples prohibited from marrying,
yet having a similarly situated counterpart among heterosexuals, is those
who do have children. Given the traditional and powerful argument that
children should be brought up in stable, two-parent homes whenever pos-
sible,7" the reasons for denying only homosexual people the right to
marry in order to form such a home virtually disappear. Given the fact
that the parent's homosexuality was, most likely, one of the critical fac-
tors leading to the breakup of the opposite-sex marriage which produced
697. Fellner, Gays' Difflculties with Adoptions Outlined, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 16, 1989, pt. 1
at 5, col. 2.
698. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4100 (West 1983).
699. "It is estimated that one in every six [heterosexual] couples of child-bearing age has a
fertility problem." Levine, Booming Baby Technology, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1989, at El, col. 3.
Laws are underinclusive if they do not apply to enough of the activity which the law purports
to be aimed at. See Tussman & tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341 (1949).
700. See Fellner, Gays' Difflculties with Adoptions Outlined, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 16, 1989,
pt. I, at 5, col. 2.
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the children, 70 1 punishing such parents by denying them any right to re-
build a satisfying home within the protected confines of a legal marriage
arbitrarily uses state power with the potential of harming the state by
prohibiting some good homes from coming into existence.
Moreover, the discrimination in some states is quite overt. Califor-
nia, for example, had to amend its marriage statute to prohibit gay or
lesbian marriages.70 2 California Civil Code section 4100 had read, "Mar-
riage is a personal relationship arising out of a civil contract." In 1977,
the legislature added the words "between a man and a woman. "703 Thus,
the law had not only a discriminatory effect, but a clear discriminatory
purpose. What, besides bias, underlies this discrimination, is a question
no state has yet successfully answered.7°
Nor have states even begun to address the public advantages of
same-sex marriage. For example, a state generally feels it has an interest
in prohibiting promiscuity.70 5 Marriage, thus,. theoretically, keeps sexual
encounters within relational bounds. Why, then, would a state wish to
prohibit homosexual residents from forming relational ties? States, in
fact, condemn homosexual citizens for their supposed promiscuity, based
on a believed lack of sexual control.70 6 But what option do homosexual
citizens have? As noted in a City of Los Angeles task force report, "Pub-
lic policy must either encourage relationships, or it must encourage the
alternative to relationships, which is random sexual encounters. '70 7
Given the fact that adults have sexual needs, there is no middle ground.
More to the point, given the realities of AIDS, public policy would seem
to demand that gay men, particularly, be encouraged to form stable rela-
701. See, e.g., M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1986). See also cases
discussed supra notes 498-632 and accompanying text.
702. See Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 524, 213 Cal. Rptr at 415 (discussing history of
statute).
703. Act of Aug. 17, 1977, ch. 339, § 1, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1295. Note that a "boy" or "girl"
could not legally contract a marriage (or anything else), and thus, the only reason for including
"man" and "woman" is to differentiate the parties based on gender.
704. For an examination of the rationales often advanced by states in support of denying
marriage licenses to gay or lesbian couples, and the answering arguments, see Friedman, supra
note 684, at 160-69.
705. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
706. See Gold, Morality and Homosexuality, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at B8, col. 4 (quot-
ing Murray Kempton that homosexuality is "the vagrant impulse of the loins"). California
Congressman William Dannemeyer stated recently on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives that "the average homosexual has.., sex two or three times a week" and with "1,000 or
more partners in his lifetime." Malinowski, "The Fine Print," Spy, Nov. 1989, at 32 (quoting
Dannemeyer speech, June 29, 1989).
707. CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, supp. pt. I at S-226.
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tionships. A policy which does not allow them to do so would not seem
to meet any standard of rationality at all.
In addition to equal protection, discriminatory marriage laws can be
challenged under a substantive due process rationale. One commentator
has described this approach as "uniquely concrete. ' 708  This approach
would force courts to look at the real lives of gay and lesbian couples as
the law affects them. More important, courts would have to address the
fact that the right to marry is fundamental, "one of the basic civil rights
of man."7 09 In order to deny this right to an entire group of people, a
state would have to show that its actions are narrowly drawn to protect
compelling state interests.710
Another constitutional challenge to state marriage laws, as dis-
cussed above71 is available under a coalition of the first amendment's
protection of the freedom of association and the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause, as laid out in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.
7'2
Whether a particular relationship can claim this protection depends on:
1) the number of people in the relationship; 2) its congeniality; 3) its
duration; 4) the purposes for which it was formed; and 5) its selectivity in
choosing participants.713 The Ninth Circuit has recently utilized this
test to determine that the relationship of women employed by an escort
service and their clients was not protected because of the commercial
nature of the relationship.714 Where the commercial aspect is absent, the
result should change accordingly.7" 5 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found
that a police officer has a constitutionally protected right to date the wo-
man of his choice, even though she was the daughter of a convicted felon
and reputed mobster.7 6 Because of the nature and effects of marriage,
both to society and to individuals, 717 state marriage statutes are espe-
cially important in establishing relational-and obligational-certainty.
In this context, Roberts seems to be an ideal means of illuminating the
constitutional boundaries of a state's marriage laws.
Other challenges are also available to discriminatory marriage laws.
State constitutions may provide even greater protection than the United
708. Friedman, supra note 684, at 152.
709. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
710. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155 (1973).
711. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
712. 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
713. Id.
714. IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988).
715. d at 1194.
716. Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984).
717. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
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States Constitution.71 Whatever challenges are made, one thing is cer-
tain: public debate will be heated and divisive.7 19 Our investment in
marriage as a heterosexual institution is tremendous, and is sure to color
any public discourse on the issue. It is for that reason that alternatives
become so important.
B. De Facto Families
The New York court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates, Co.720 utilized
the most immediate interim solution to the marriage problem-it recog-
nized same-sex couples as de facto family members.12 ' This approach
offers several advantages. Particularly in cases like those in New York,
where the party has not only suffered the anguish of the loss of a life
partner, but must also face an eviction proceeding with the prospect of a
dramatically higher rent piled on to the already existing trauma of being
forced to move out of the home he and his partner shared, sometimes for
more than a decade-in such cases a court's sense of the equities must
and can run in favor of this survivor.
More important, though, is that it is a method by which the court
can, if it wishes, open its eyes to the facts of the relationship. Courts
which permit a de facto family analysis allow the facts effect. Such
courts are able to see that homosexual couples are born into a system
that was not designed to be fair to them. De facto family status is a
superficial remedy until the legislature or the courts can address the
problem as it really exists. However inadequate, though, it is a rem-
edy.722 While this approach to family status can provide relief in indi-
vidual circumstances, though, it is by no means universally accepted.
Many judges reject appeals to individual justice and fairness as not in
keeping with a more utilitarian conception of those terms.
718. See Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1269 (1985).
719. See, e.g., Landers, Gay Marriage Draws Mail, L.A. Times, Nov. 27, 1989, at E9, col. 5
(columnist had received 55,000 letters regarding column about same-sex marriage).
720. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
721. Id. at 213, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
722. See generally Brief amici curiae of Family Service America, Institute for the Study of
Human Resources, Bar Association for Human Rights of Greater New York, Right Reverend
Paul Moore, Episcopal Bishop of New York, Riverside Church Office of Peace and Social
Justice, Reverend Forrest Church of Unitarian Church of All Souls, and Rabbi Balfour
Brickner of Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d
49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
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C. Domestic Partnerships
Domestic partnership, the third solution, is one being offered by the
gay and lesbian community itself, as well as others.723 Domestic partner-
ship is a contract between the parties ascertaining that their relationship
exhibits the core characteristics of an intimate association like mar-
riage.724 Such a contract is a challenge to the traditional view that there
are only two sorts of people in the world, those who are married and
those who are single. Same-sex couples are inarguably not married, yet
neither are they single as that word is understood-they would not, for
example, consider themselves free to date others, one of the most com-
mon aspects of being single. Domestic partnership recognizes that "fam-
ily" may include a third category of not-married, not-single people, and
defines that category using already existing legal principles, so that it
may be acknowledged not only by judges, but by legislators, employers,
and a host of others.725
The concept begins with a most basic fact about the relationship-
its domestic character. Recalling the origins of the word "family" in the
Roman household,7 26 domestic partnership requires that the partners live
together.727 While this is not a requirement made of married couples, it
provides, in a legal context, a piece of threshold evidence that a relation-
ship exists between the parties. A specified minimum time the couple
have been living together may also be required.
7 28
But people may live together for a variety of reasons that have noth-
ing to do with a family relationship between them, including the obvious
economic ones in increasingly expensive housing markets. The next re-
quirement, then, is that the partners have what the California Supreme
Court apparently believed to be a critical aspect of the marital relation-
ship, responsibilities or obligations to one another.729 Thus, the partners
must assert mutual obligations of support. 730 And in order to deter
abuse and assure the relationship's similarity to traditional voluntary
723. See PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY FOR CALIFORNIA: FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE
JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY, 79-83 (1989); Gutis, Family Rede-
fines Itself and Now the Law Follows, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, pt. 4 at 6, col.l; Develop-
ments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 684, at 1623-28.
724. See CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, at 81-82.
725. Id.
726. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
727. CITY OF LOS ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, at 101.
728. Id. at 101 (twelve-month requirement).
729. See Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275, 753 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259
(1988).
730. CITY OF Los ANGELES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 85, at 101.
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adult family relationships, the partners must be each other's sole domes-
tic partner.7 3
To distinguish domestic partnership from other kinds of already
protected family relationships, the partners must not be married, nor
may they be related by blood.732 And, quite importantly, they must be
over. eighteen years old and competent to contract with one another.733
Finally, the partners must make a provision to dissolve or alter the con-
tract if any conditions change.
The definition of domestic partnership proposed for use in the City
of Los Angeles is typical:
Domestic partners are two persons who declare that:
(1) they currently reside in the same household, and have been
doing so for the previous 12 months
(2) they share the common necessities of life
(3) they have a mutual obligation of support, and are each
other's sole domestic partner
(4) they are both over 18 years of age and are competent to
contract
(5) neither partner is married
(6) neither partner is related by blood to the other
(7) they agree to notify the appropriate agency within 30 days if
any of the above facts change.
734
The contract of domestic partnership can be used in a variety of
contexts: to secure employment benefits; as a private contract between
the partners; to qualify partners for the family discount on insurance pol-
icies, or at private institutions such as health clubs. Regardless of the
context in which such contracts would be used, the partners will have
created documentary evidence of their relationship. Under Marvin v.
Marvin,73 5 the contract would be binding on the parties.736 Thus, the
contract defuses objections like those of the California Supreme Court in
Elden v. Sheldon 737 that unmarried couples who do not have legally en-




734. Id. Note that this proposal was made in the context of receiving certain city employ-
ment benefits, thus the agency notification in (7). Id. This requirement would be worded
differently depending on the context in which it were being used (i.e. private contract between
the partners, affidavit on file with insurance carrier for health benefits, etc.).
735. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
736. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
737. 46 Cal. 3d 267, 275, 753 P.2d 582, 587, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259 (1988).
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ery.738 Domestic partners do have legally enforceable obligations to one
another, including contract rights and support.
739
In fact, the constitutional arguments in favor of legalizing same-sex
marriage take on even more vigor in the context of domestic partnership.
While it may be possible for courts to try to distinguish marriage as (for
whatever reasons) a peculiarly heterosexual institution, arguments to
deny gay men and lesbians a potential family relationship analagous to
marriage would, in fact, deny gay and lesbian couples the right to any
family relationship. The right to intimate association mentioned in Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees7' becomes meaningless for all but hetero-
sexual people. To be permitted to have a lifetime relationship with
someone that has virtually no legal effect including, most importantly,
the privacy protection given the sexual aspects of marital relation-
ships, 4 is a gross example of distinctly unequal treatment.
Nor is this mere speculation. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected
Marvin in Hewitt v. Hewitt.742 This apparently leaves gay and lesbian
couples in Illinois with no legal relational options at all. In states which
accept Marvin, while it would be advantageous to challenge the marriage
laws, challenges become less urgent as long as this relational option (even
though it is an inferior one on many counts) is available. Further, the
Supreme Court would be less likely to strike down discriminatory mar-
riage laws if the state could show homosexual couples had a legitimate
way of forming a comparable family relationship with concomitant rela-
tional protection.
Domestic partnership is not a proposal for spousal equivalency. In
the present legal system married couples, by virtue of their marriage re-
ceive certain benefits, such as tax preferences, employment benefits and
tort recovery to which no other relationship may lay claim.743 Because
domestic partnership is not a marriage, it does not automatically entitle
the partners to established statutory benefits. But it is a new category of
family relationship which may eventually be considered within those
738. Id.
739. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674-75, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
740. 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984). See also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544-45 (1987); IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1191-93 (9th
Cir. 1988).
741. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217-18 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
742. 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
743. Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988) (tort recov-
ery); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1985) (employment benefits); but see Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49,
544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989) (gay couple may claim lease succession rights as one another's family
members).
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statutory schemes. If discriminatory marriage statutes are successfully
challenged the need for this new category disappears because all citizens
may opt for marriage, and the issue of whether to marry or not truly
becomes a choice. As long as it is not a meaningful choice for homosex-
ual and bisexual people, domestic partnership offers employers, legisla-
tors, private businesses and courts a way to avoid discrimination against
a family relationship which exhibits many or most of the characteristics
we value as a society.
There is no question that domestic partnership begins as an inferior
solution to the marriage problem, a "separate but equal" status for yet
another group of people disenfranchised by the majority. A genuine
question arises whether we wish to reenact in one more context the sepa-
rate but equal battle which has once before torn this country apart. Do-
mestic partnership, by its nature, is only permissive; where marriage
mandates certain benefits be given, domestic partnership allows such
benefits. Why then, bother with it when, clearly, discrimination on the
basis of marriage is the true evil?
First, domestic partnership acknowledges a class that already exists,
but is ignored with vigor by the public at large. The stereotype of the
lonely, aging homosexual outcast is one of our most powerful imagina-
tive punishments for the "lifestyle" of homosexuality. Its satisfactory
force is dissolved by admitting into the imaginative realm the reality that
gay and lesbian couples spend their lives together, relaxing into old age
side by side, as heterosexual couples do.'" That the admission of this
most basic fact is a step forward demonstrates how deeply imaginative
stereotypes have burrowed into our public conscience.
Equally important, though, is the fact that domestic partnership is a
method by which gay and lesbian couples may declare publicly their in-
tentions and obligations toward one another in a legally significant way.
Rather than the de facto determinations made by the New York court in
Braschi, domestic partners may state their beliefs about their relationship
at the outset (or, given the minimum time-limit for the requirement of
living together, within a reasonable time after the onset of the relation-
ship's domestic character), and may point to that contract if the relation-
ship is questioned for any reason. The existence of such a document in
cases like In re Guardianship of Kowalski7 45 or Hinman v. Department of
744. See, eg., Wockner, Canadian Couple Fights for Pension, FRONTIERS NEWSMAG., Nov.
16, 1988, at 9 (Canadian couple together for 40 years suing Canadian Health and Welfare
Department for joint old-age pension).
745. 382 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. App.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1085 (1986).
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Personnel Administration74 6 would almost certainly have had a signifi-
cant impact on the courts' analyses, and could well have changed the
outcome of either case. Even if it had not, it would likely have exposed
the courts' apparent bias against homosexual couples even more clearly
than was already the case. Gay and lesbian couples like those in Hinman
and Kowalski are striving for precisely this ability to make their inten-
tions clear and legally significant. Recognition of domestic partnerships
would be a genuine improvement over the current state of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION: SHARED VALUES
"Yes... people are meant to go through life two by two. 'Tain't
natural to be lonesome. "
747
This Comment has been a first attempt to examine the set of inter-
locking problems and paradoxes which face homosexual couples under a
statutory and linguistic scheme that makes no provision for their exist-
ence. Appeals have been made by some to the traditions of this country
in an effort to continue to deny recognition to gay and lesbian couples, or
give legal force to the bond of love and commitment which holds them
together. If it is the tradition of this country to deny important ties based
on love, it is a tradition which relies on intolerance, fear and hatred, and
it does not apply to everyone. A more powerful tradition exists in the
United States, though: the tradition of pluralism, of making room in the
law for all who wish to participate in and meaningfully contribute to this
country, the states, and the communities in which they live. It is only in
the last century of our history that we have begun to realize that tradi-
tion means giving life to the idea of equality proclaimed at the nation's
birth and reaffirmed as a result of the Civil War.
The problem of equality continues to vex our courts, our legislatures
and our people. One of the questions underlying this Comment which
transcends the narrower legal scope is the question of why we insist that
some differences matter and some do not. Why did race or gender or
sexual orientation take on the proportions of significance they have,
while height, or hair color which are equally notable distinctions remain
matters of indifference to the law? More specifically why does the legal
system need to use factors such as gender or race or sexual orientation as
criteria upon which to recognize rights and deny benefits?
The sociological earthquake that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s
helped us recognize the validity of those questions. That earthquake is
746. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
747. T. WILDER, Our Town, in THREE PLAYS BY THORNTON WILDER 34 (1958).
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not over. Every day gay and lesbian couples face the marriage statutes
and must ask "Why should the laws applying to us be so different?"
While I have discussed the problem narrowly in the context of gay and
lesbian couples, the broader question of our treatment of difference re-
mains. It underlies, not only our treatment of gay and lesbian couples,
women, or non-Caucasian races, but also other groups such as the dis-
abled, the poor and the elderly. In our majoritarian culture many devia-
tions from a purely statistical norm are not only looked on as suspect,
they are often punished in ways that differ only in their degree of sub-
tlety. In light of this, it is important to question the law's ultimate pur-
pose. When punishment is the point, the law's purpose in not to punish
the different, it is to punish the wrong. The two are not the same. One of
the philosophical underpinnings of this country is that dissenters may
sometimes hold the truth.
This holds with even more force for those whose difference was
never intended as dissent. Blackness is not a dissent. A black woman
may hold ideas and beliefs identical to those of a white woman, and yet
her blackness is too often taken a priori as a kind of disagreement. Simi-
larly, any woman may hold to the same political or religious tenents as
any man, and yet there is nearly always an unstated assumption that her
very sex provides a conflict, that the man and the woman may not ever
achieve perfect identity solely because of her condition as a woman. But
a condition is different from a dissent.
This is powerfully true for gay men and lesbians. They do not in-
tend their sexual orientation itself to be a dissent from heterosexuality.
Yet it may be assumed that politically active gay men and lesbians are
challenging the fact of heterosexuality. This is not true. The challenge is
not to heterosexuality, but to institutions created only for heterosexuals.
Similarly, many blacks never meant to challenge people who were white,
but only the institutions whites had created which treated blacks as
inferior.
In fact, the constant proof that minority groups are not dissenting
from the values held by the society of which they are a part is that they
inevitably appeal to the repository of the country's shared values as their
vindication and justification: the Constitution. The claim is not that the
majority and the minority hold different values, but that the majority
have not acted on the values that all have proclaimed they share. Rather
than asserting dissent, the minority is asserting a commonality that is not
present in the existing legal system. The challenge is not founded on
fundamental difference, but on a fundamental similarity that has gone
unrecognized-shared values.
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This Comment has been an attempt to illustrate how homosexual
couples are trying to assert the shared value of family relationships. The
claim is that the majority, taking their cue from the limited available
understanding of our present vocabulary, have constructed a legal system
that asserts that value only on behalf of itself. The heterosexual majority
not only deny love and commitment as values held by homosexual citi-
zens, but prevent homosexual couples from claiming them as values even
when that is empirically not the case. The Constitution was not designed
as a tool to divide the citizens of this country from one another, nor as a
device to maintain a majority's fiction about a minority. Its use to those
ends has been a wrong this country has perpetrated upon itself. There
are enemies enough to the values we share; we threaten our own good
when we create enemies out of friends. The Constitution holds equality
up as an ideal. It cannot be used to enforce inequality where inequality
does not exist. That is precisely what laws that distinguish between het-
erosexual couples and homosexual couples do. The divisiveness, irration-
ality and fear at the heart of those laws cannot be tolerated. The law
should beat with better blood.
David Link*
* This is dedicated to my parents, Rose and Francis Link, who taught me, through 37
years-and counting-of their example that love is nothing if it is not honest. This Comment
is an application of that simple and fundamental lesson.
My special thanks to Thomas F. Coleman.
Finally, a tip of the hat in memory of Kary Londagin, who died of AIDS on December
21, 1989, at the age of 36.
1152 [Vol. 23:1055
